Hwasong-11D
| Hwasong-11D | |
|---|---|
| Type | Short-range ballistic missile Tactical ballistic missile |
| Place of origin | North Korea |
| Service history | |
| In service | 2022–present |
| Used by | Korean People's Army Strategic Force |
| Production history | |
| Designed | 2022 |
| Manufacturer | North Korea |
| Developed from | Hwasong-11A |
| No. built | Over 250 launchers |
| Specifications | |
| Mass | 3,000 kg (6,600 lb) |
| Length | 5.5 m (18 ft) |
| Diameter | 0.76 m (2 ft 6 in) |
| Warhead | 500–700 kg (1,100–1,500 lb) Hwasan-31 |
| Engine | Solid-propelled engine |
Operational range | 235 km (146 mi) |
| Flight altitude | 50 km (31 mi) |
Guidance system | "Autonomous navigation system" |
Launch platform | 3-axle TEL |
The Hwasong-11D[a] (Korean: 《화성포-11라》형; lit. 'Mars Artillery Type 11D') is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled tactical ballistic missile. It was first observed in April 2022 during a flight test. A smaller variant of Hwasong-11A, it has a smaller size and a shorter range compared to its baseline version, suggesting it may be optimized for tactical missions. Hwasong-11D is known to have entered mass production and deliveries to North Korean army.
Description
| Images of the Hwasong-11D | |
|---|---|
Missile
Hwasong-11D is the smaller variant of Hwasong-11A,[1] designed to be capable of striking shorter range targets and cost-effective.[2] It is estimated to be 5.5 m (18 ft) long, 0.76 m (2 ft 6 in) wide and has a launch mass of nearly 3,000 kg (6,600 lb).[3] While Hwasong-11D is claimed to be the smallest short-range ballistic missile of North Korea,[4] its range, which is estimated to be about 235 km (146 mi),[5] led the missile to be classified as a close-range ballistic missile (CRBM).[6] Hwasong-11D may also have an advanced variant, which has a range of 300 km (190 mi).[7] According to United Nations Security Council member nations, the Hwasong-11D also has an underwater-based version, a submarine-launched ballistic missile first tested on 19 October 2021, later known as Hwasong-11S.[8] Along with Hwasong-11B, it appears to be based on United States's ATACMS, with the North Korean missile having newer technology, longer range and more accuracy.[9]
It is assessed that Hwasong-11D could be a counterpart to the South Korean's KTSSM, especially the role. The launches were accompanied with a statement, associating them with the development of tactical nuclear weapons,[10] as well as the improvement of frontline long-range artillery units's firepower.[11] Hwasong-11D follows a near-ballistic trajectory, with approximately 50 km (31 mi) apogee. This low apogee, combined with its short flight time and terminal maneuverability, makes it difficult for traditional missile defense systems to detect and intercept. Moreover, the missile's improved accuracy reduces the number of missiles required to attack the target.[12] Also, Hwasong-11D can have better survivability against missile defenses if the missile is equipped with smaller and lighter tactical nuclear warheads while retaining the Hwasong-11A's maneuverability, thus allowing it to threaten shorter range targets.[10]
Hwasong-11D is claimed to be capable of carrying a 500–700 kg (1,100–1,500 lb) payload, likely conventional, fragmentation, submunition,[3] or chemical.[6] It can also be armed with the Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead.[13]
According to German analyst Norbert Brügge, Hwasong-11D is a derivative from KN-25 and Hwasong-11/OTR-21 Tochka. He evaluates the missile to be a type of multiple rocket launcher,[14] despite North Korean official claim of tactical ballistic missile.[15]
Launcher
Basic type
According to North Korea, the Hwasong-11D missile system, including the launcher, was personally designed by Kim Jong Un as a "new pivotal attack weapon" of North Korean forces.[16][17] The basic-type TEL is a 3-axle truck,[4] estimated to be 8.5 m (28 ft) long and 3 m (9.8 ft) wide.[18] Each basic-type launcher can deploy up to four Hwasong-11D missiles.[12]
Modular type
During a military exhibition opened on 4 October 2025, North Korea unveiled a modular three-axle launcher of Hwasong-11D. Believed to be inspired in design from United States's HIMARS, it has two modules, each of which can carry a single Hwasong-11D missile or multiple launch rockets of 122 mm and 240 mm diameters.[19] This system is tentatively named Juche-HIMARS by analysts.[20] However, it is unlikely that the Hwasong-11D missiles carried by the modular-type launcher are nuclear-armed.[21]
Possible air-borne launcher
Assuming a weight of 1,500 kg (3,300 lb), it is possible that Hwasong-11D can be carried by Korean People's Army Air Force's Harbin H-5/Ilyushin Il-28 after necessary modifications.[22]
Naming
North Korean state media began referring to Hwasong-11D as Hwasongpho-11 Ra (《화성포-11라》형) from April 2026,[15] although the official designation was revealed through photo evidence in March 2023, during its coverage on the Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead.[7] The official designation can also be romanized as Hwasong-11La, Hwasong-11Ra or Hwasongpho-11D.[23][24] However, in its earlier launches, occurred between 2022 and 2024, the Hwasong-11D was called "tactical guided weapon" and later, "tactical ballistic missile", instead of its formal name.[25][26]
In April 2025, it was revealed that Hwasong-11D had been designated KN-35 by the US military under its naming convention.[7][27]
History
Hwasong-11D made its public debut on 16 April 2022 with a flight test.[28] In this test, North Korea referred to Hwasong-11D as a "new-type tactical guided weapon".[29] Nine days later, on 25 April 2022, North Korea displayed Hwasong-11D during a military parade.[4]
Further test-fires of Hwasong-11D occurred on 2 November 2022 and on 9 March 2023.[30][31] Between these test-fires, North Korea displayed Hwasong-11D during a military parade on 8 February 2023.[32]
It was reported at the third test launch of Hwasong-11D that the missile had already received an undisclosed official designation.[33] In late-March 2023, the official name of Hwasong-11D was confirmed in the Korean Central News Agency's report on the new Hwasan-31 nuclear warhead,[34] although a partial and blurred name was only displayed.[35]
Hwasong-11D made two further appearances in 2024: a test flight occurred on 17 May and a ceremony of transferring 250 launchers to frontline military units on 4 August.[36][37] According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2026, North Korea is possessing 250 Hwasong-11D launchers.[38]: 277
A further test of Hwasong-11D occurred on 19 April 2026.[39] This time, the Korean Central News Agency mentioned Hwasong-11D directly for the first time,[40] and images also showed the area impacted by warheads, unlike an earlier launch of the submunition-armed Hwasong-11A in early April.[41] Additional tests of Hwasong-11D occurred on 26 May and 25 June 2026 involving "special mission" warhead.[42][43]
List of tests
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, between 2022 and 2024, North Korea conducted at least nine test launches of Hwasong-11D.[44]
Confirmed tests
| Attempt | Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) | Location | Number of missiles tested | Outcome | Additional notes | References |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 16 April 2022 | Chakto-dong, Hungnam, Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province | 2 | Success | South Korea detected the launch around 2 p.m., with the missiles being fired with a 21-minute interval between launches. It flew for 60 seconds and achieved 25 km (16 mi) apogee, 110 km (68 mi) range and a maximum speed of Mach 4 (4,900 km/h; 3,000 mph). Kim Jong Un oversaw the launch. | [8][45][46] |
| 2 | 2 November 2022 | Chongju, North Pyongan Province | 2 | Success | On 7 November 2022, North Korea released photos of missile launches from 2 to 5 November, including images of a Hwasong-11D test-fire occurred on 2 November 2022. However, a photo from the April 2022 test was reused to refer to the November test. | [7][30][47] |
| 3 | 9 March 2023 | Taesong Lake, South Pyongan Province | 6 | Success | Images from North Korean state media showed the launch of six Hwasong-11D missiles, occurred during a fire assault drill conducted by the Hwasong artillery unit. These missiles hit a sea target, but the flight distance and altitude were unknown. Kim Jong Un attended the launch with his daughter. | [31][48][49] |
| 4 | 17 May 2024 | Wonsan | 1 (North Korea) "Several" (South Korea) |
Success | Kim Jong Un supervised the launch. According to North Korean state media, the missile employed a new autonomous navigation system. South Korean's Joint Chiefs of Staff detected the launch of several Hwasong-11D missiles, at 3:10 p.m. (local time). These missiles flew 300 km (190 mi) before landing in waters between South Korea and Japan. | [36][50][51] |
| 5 | 19 April 2026 | Sinpo, South Hamgyong Province | 5 | Success | South Korean military detected the launch of multiple ballistic missiles near Sinpo at 6:10 a.m. local time, and North Korean statement indicated the launch involved five upgraded Hwasong-11D missiles that travelled 136 km (85 mi). These missiles, equipped with cluster and fragmentation mine warheads, hit a target area of 12.5–13 ha (31–32 acres) with "very high density". Kim Jong Un oversaw the test with his daughter and senior military officials. | [3][15][23] |
| 6 | 26 May 2026 | Chongju, North Pyongan Province | 1 | Success | The Hwasong-11D missile, equipped with a "special mission" warhead, was launched along with 240 mm multiple launch rockets and tactical cruise missiles. It was fired from a lightweight, modular TEL first unveiled in October 2025. Kim Jong Un attended the test. | [20][42][52] |
| 7 | 25 June 2026 | Ragwon County, South Hamgyong Province | At least 2 | Success | A Kim Jong Un-supervised launch that South Korean military delayed in alerting, despite real-time tracking. Like the May 2026 test, it was also to test the "special mission" warhead that can be used to attack facilities in South Korea, including airfields, ports and power stations. Images show two launchers fired the missiles southward, striking an island target near a Kim Jong Un's private residence. | [53][54][55] |
Alleged tests
North Korea fired eight ballistic missiles from at least four different locations on 5 June 2022,[56] two of which might be Hwasong-11D as they flew at an extremely low altitude and travelled to a short distance.[7][8]
Another alleged test of Hwasong-11D occurred in March 2025,[6] in which multiple missiles were apparently launched toward Yellow Sea on the 10th.[57]
Operational use
Mass production of launchers
According to NK News, a factory in Pyongsong is one of the facilities assembling Hwasong-11D launchers, with the production activities of TELs starting from at least November 2023.[58]
A total number of at least 154 Hwasong-11D launchers were spotted by North Korean state media in the two reports published in January and May 2024.[58] The first one, published on 10 January 2024, showed at least 45 Hwasong-11D TELs during Kim Jong Un's inspection to unnamed missile launcher factories on 8 and 9 January 2024. According to the report, the factories have "deployed new weapon types and equipment to the first-line large combined units and major missile units", suggesting Hwasong-11D is operational.[59][60] Four months later, images from a similar state media report indicated around 99 Hwasong-11D launchers being inspected by Kim Jong Un during a visit to another unnamed factory on 14 May 2024.[61][62][63]
Deployment
Given its short range and low altitude recorded during testing, if Hwasong-11D become deployed, these missiles will target South Korea.[64]
In 2023, North Korea replaced Hwasong-6 (Scud-C) operation with the deployment of Hwasong-11D at the Majang-ri missile base, according to Decker Eveleth's analysis for NK News in August 2024.[65]
North Korea held a ceremony to send 250 Hwasong-11D launchers to the frontline military units at the Inter-Korean border on 4 August 2024. The ceremony took place in Pyongyang and was attended by Kim Jong Un.[66][67][68]
See also
Notes
References
- ↑ Xu, Tianran (8 August 2023). "Brief on 27 July 2023 Parade of the DPRK" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. p. 6. Retrieved 21 September 2025.
- ↑ Jo, Jang-won (27 April 2026). "[Sejong Focus] Assessment of North Korea's Missile Development Trends: January through April 2026". Sejong Institute. Retrieved 17 May 2026.
- 1 2 3 Đào Cảnh (20 April 2026). "Tên lửa Hwasong-11 Ra công nghệ đạn chùm, vũ khí 'rải thảm' đầy uy lực mới của Triều Tiên" [Hwasong-11 Ra missile with cluster warhead is the new powerful fragmentation weapon of North Korea]. VietNamNet (in Vietnamese). Retrieved 20 April 2026.
- 1 2 3 "Overview of the DPRK's 25 April 2022 Military Parade" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. 2 May 2022. p. 18. Retrieved 2 January 2025.
- ↑ "Hwasong-11D (Hwasong-11Ra, KN-35)". NK Pro. NK News. 17 August 2026. Retrieved 20 August 2026.
- 1 2 3 Weichert, Brandon J. (16 April 2025). "North Korea's New Close-Range Ballistic Missile Could Be a Game Changer". Center for the National Interest. Retrieved 27 May 2025.
- 1 2 3 4 5 Yoshinaga, Kenji (24 April 2026). "Analysis on the Strategic Significance Observed in the Test Launch of the Tactical Ballistic Missile Hwasong-11 Ra (KN-35)". DEEP DIVE. DEEP DIVE General Incorporated Association. Archived from the original on 23 May 2026. Retrieved 23 May 2026.
- 1 2 3 "S/2022/668". UNDOCS. United Nations. 7 September 2022. pp. 24, 29–30, 143. Retrieved 23 May 2026.
- ↑ "Kho tên lửa Triều Tiên: từ Hwasong-20 đến KN-25" [North Korea's missile arsenal: from Hwasong-20 to KN-25]. Báo Nghệ An (in Vietnamese). Nghe An Newspaper and Radio, Television. 29 November 2025. Retrieved 29 November 2025.
- 1 2 Van Diepen, Vann H. (25 April 2022). "North Korea's New Short-Range Ballistic Missile". 38 North. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
- ↑ "DPRK Military Parade Viewbook 2022" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. 21 April 2022. p. 14. Retrieved 29 December 2024.
- 1 2 Quỳnh Như (17 May 2024). "Triều Tiên tăng cường sản xuất tên lửa đạn đạo" [North Korea increases ballistic missile production]. Tiền Phong (in Vietnamese). Retrieved 4 January 2025.
- ↑ Yang, Uk (29 June 2023). 북한의 최신 핵무기 개발 현황: 핵그림자를 드리우는 북한의 인지전 시도 [North Korea's latest nuclear weapons developments: North Korea's cognitive warfare attempts to cast a nuclear shadow]. Asan Institute for Policy Studies (in Korean). Retrieved 26 July 2025.
- ↑ Brügge, Norbert. "Pukguksong MLRS". b14643.eu. Norbert Brügge. Retrieved 7 April 2026.
- 1 2 3 "DPRK Missile Administration Test-fires Tactical Ballistic Missiles". Korean Central News Agency. 20 April 2026. Retrieved 1 July 2026.
- ↑ Bhardwaj, Abhishek (5 August 2024). "North Korea deploys 250 nuclear-capable missile launchers near South Korea". Interesting Engineering. Retrieved 19 May 2025.
- ↑ McCartney, Micah (26 August 2024). "North Korea Missile Launchers Pose Fresh Threat". Newsweek. Retrieved 19 May 2025.
- ↑ Laws, Jasmine (13 August 2024). "North Korea Satellite Images Show Huge Weapons Factory: Report". Newsweek. Retrieved 19 May 2025.
The launchers are believed to be designed for Hwasong-11D short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) because they measure around 8.5 meters in length and 3 meters in width [...]
- ↑ "Modular MRL (122mm/240mm rockets or Hwasong-11D)". NK Pro. NK News. 17 August 2026. Retrieved 18 August 2026.
- 1 2 Việt Dũng (2 June 2026). "Triều Tiên gây bất ngờ khi ra mắt hai hệ thống tên lửa giống cả Mỹ và Nga" [North Korea makes surprise as they unveiled two missile systems similar to those of the US and Russia]. An ninh Thủ đô (in Vietnamese). Retrieved 30 June 2026.
- ↑ Van Diepen, Vann H. (4 November 2025). "It Is Autumn in North Korea, and the Missiles Are Changing. Are They Past Peak?". 38 North. Retrieved 6 November 2025.
- ↑ Tianran, Xu (21 September 2023). "Nuclearization of the KPAN: Expansion of the DPRK's Sea-Based Nuclear Capabilities" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 19 May 2025.
The DPRK has developed a small aero-ballistic missile referred to as the Hwasong-11Ra [Hwasong-11D]. Assuming that the Hwasong-11Ra has a weight comparable to that of its ROK counterpart, the KTSSM (1.5 tons), it may be possible for the Harbin H-5/Il-28 of the KPAF to carry at least one Hwasong-11Ra after necessary modifications [...]
- 1 2 Shim, Kyu-seok (20 April 2026). "North Korean leader Kim oversaw test of missiles with cluster warheads". Reuters. Retrieved 20 April 2026.
- ↑ JSF (4 April 2023). 北朝鮮のファサン31戦術核弾頭の量産とその影響 [North Korea's mass production of Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warheads and its impact]. Yahoo News Japan (in Japanese). Retrieved 3 January 2025.
- ↑ "N Korea tests new weapon that 'will boost nuclear capabilities'". Al Jazeera. 17 April 2022. Retrieved 11 February 2026.
- ↑ "DPRK Missile Administration Conducts Test Fire of Tactical Ballistic Missile That Employs New Technology". Minju Joson. 18 May 2024. Retrieved 20 March 2026.
- ↑ Lee, Keun-pyung; Lee, Yu-jeong (13 April 2025). [단독]美, 北 CRBM에 코드명 ‘KN-35’ 붙였다…KN-25 이후 30번대 넘버링 첫 확인 [(Exclusive) US gives North Korea CRBM codename 'KN-35'... First confirmation of 30-series numbering since KN-25]. The JoongAng (in Korean). Retrieved 27 May 2025.
- ↑ "S/2024/215". UNDOCS. United Nations. 7 March 2024. p. 127. Retrieved 23 May 2026.
The Hwasong 11Ra, also designated Hwasong 11D, is a smaller variant of the Hwasong 11Ga (KN-23). It was first seen when fired on 16 April 2022.
- ↑ "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Observes Test-fire of New-type Tactical Guided Weapon". Korean Central News Agency. 17 April 2022. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
- 1 2 "S/2023/171". UNDOCS. United Nations. 7 March 2023. p. 182. Retrieved 23 May 2026.
- 1 2 "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". Nuclear Threat Initiative. 12 November 2024. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
- ↑ Van Diepen, Vann H. (15 February 2023). "North Korea's Feb. 8 Parade Highlights ICBMs and Tactical Nukes". 38 North. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
- ↑ JSF (10 March 2023). 北朝鮮が新型小型短距離弾道ミサイル6発同時発射 [North Korea simultaneously launches six new, small, short-range ballistic missiles]. Yahoo News Japan (in Japanese). Retrieved 3 January 2025.
新型小型短距離弾道ミサイルは火星砲の名称が与えられているようですが、型番はまだ発表されていません。
[The new small, short-range ballistic missile appears to receive the Hwasongpho-series name, but the explicit designation has not yet been announced.] - ↑ Lee, Jae-yoon (20 April 2026). [그래픽] 북한 '화성포-11라' 시험발사 [[Graphic] North Korea's test-fire of Hwasong-11D]. Yonhap News Agency (in Korean). Retrieved 19 May 2026.
- ↑ Zwirko, Colin (3 April 2023). Derr, Arius (ed.). "North Korea reveals internal names for several missile systems: Analysis". NK Pro. NK News. Retrieved 13 April 2026.
- 1 2 Mahadzir, Dzirhan (22 May 2024). "North Korea Launches Ballistic Missile Following U.S. Air Force Drills". USNI News. United States Naval Institute. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
- ↑ "Commissioning Ceremony of Ultimate Weaponry Demonstrating Sure Victory of Cause of Building Powerful Army – Ceremony for Celebrating Transfer and Receiving of New-Type Tactical Ballistic Missile System Takes Place with Splendour". Minju Joson. 5 August 2024. Retrieved 20 March 2026.
- ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies (24 February 2026). The Military Balance 2026 (1st ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-1041314240.
- ↑ Thế giới tối 20/4 [World news 20 April (evening)]. Quảng Ngãi TV (in Vietnamese). Quang Ngai Newspaper and Radio, Television. 20 April 2026. Event occurs at 4:31–5:07. Retrieved 19 May 2026.
- ↑ Lee, Jung-hyun (20 April 2026). 확산·지뢰탄 장착한 북한판 KTSSM '화성-11라'…살상력 높여 [North Korean version of KTSSM 'Hwasong-11D' equipped with cluster and mine warheads that increases lethality]. Yonhap News Agency (in Korean). Retrieved 16 May 2026.
- ↑ Van Diepen, Vann H. (22 April 2026). "Cluster Warhead Tests Underscore the Important Conventional Role of North Korea's SRBMs". 38 North. Retrieved 2 May 2026.
- 1 2 Zwirko, Colin (27 May 2026). "North Korea tests new modular missile launcher and 'tactical cruise missiles'". NK News. Retrieved 27 May 2026.
- ↑ "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Supervises Tests of Major Weapons Organized by Defence Science Research Institutes". Korean Central News Agency. 26 June 2026. Retrieved 1 July 2026.
- ↑ Gwadera, Zuzanna (24 August 2024). "North Korea doubles down on short-range ballistic-missile production". International Institute for Strategic Studies. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
- ↑ Ban Thời sự (17 April 2022). "Triều Tiên thử vũ khí chiến thuật mới" [North Korea tests new tactical weapon]. VTV Times (in Vietnamese). Vietnam Television. Retrieved 10 July 2026.
- ↑ "Triều Tiên thử vũ khí mới giúp tăng năng lực hạt nhân" [North Korea tests new weapon enhancing its nuclear capabilities]. Bắc Ninh TV (in Vietnamese). Bac Ninh Newspaper and Radio – Television. 17 April 2022. Retrieved 1 May 2026.
- ↑ Tianran, Xu; Furukawa, Katsuhisa; Bergne, Elin; Nitisa, Kristiana (11 November 2022). "Escalating Tensions on the Korean Peninsula". Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
- ↑ "Ông Kim Jong-un lệnh quân đội sẵn sàng cho "chiến tranh thực sự"" [Kim Jong Un orders the military to be ready for "real war"]. Bắc Ninh TV (in Vietnamese). Bac Ninh Newspaper and Radio – Television. 10 March 2023. Retrieved 17 January 2026.
- ↑ "Triều Tiên tiến hành tập trận tấn công hỏa lực" [North Korea conducted fire assault drill]. Thaibinh Radio & Television (in Vietnamese). Thai Binh Radio & Television Station. 11 March 2023. Archived from the original on 28 May 2023. Retrieved 11 February 2026.
- ↑ "North Korea confirms missile launch, Kim Jong Un vows bolstered nuclear force". France 24. 18 May 2024. Retrieved 25 May 2025.
- ↑ Việt Toàn (17 May 2024). "Triều Tiên xác nhận phóng thử tên lửa đạn đạo" [North Korea confirms ballistic missile test]. HTV (in Vietnamese). Ho Chi Minh City Radio and Television. Retrieved 1 June 2026.
- ↑ "Defence Science Research Institutions of DPRK Conduct Tests of Major Weapons". Korean Central News Agency. 27 May 2026. Retrieved 1 July 2026.
- ↑ Zwirko, Colin (26 June 2026). "North Korea tests ability to strike ROK power stations with tactical nukes: KCNA". NK News. Retrieved 26 June 2026.
- ↑ "Triều Tiên phô diễn hỏa lực mới" [North Korea displays new firepower]. VOH Online (in Vietnamese). Ho Chi Minh City Radio and Television. 26 June 2026. Retrieved 26 June 2026.
- ↑ Wajs-Wiejacka, Anna (29 June 2026). "Opóźniony alarm po testach rakietowych. Korea Południowa tłumaczy decyzję" [South Korea explains why they delayed in alerting after missile launch]. O2.pl (in Polish). Retrieved 30 June 2026.
- ↑ "'Nắn gân nhau' bằng tên lửa trên bán đảo Triều Tiên" [Testing each other with missiles in Korean Peninsula]. Bắc Ninh TV (in Vietnamese). Bac Ninh Newspaper and Radio – Television. 6 June 2022. Retrieved 23 May 2026.
Ngày 5-6, quân đội Hàn Quốc đã phát hiện Triều Tiên bắn 8 tên lửa tầm ngắn trong vòng 35 phút từ ít nhất 4 địa điểm khác nhau.
[On 5 June, South Korean military detected North Korea had fired eight short-range missiles within 35 minutes from at least four different locations.] - ↑ "Hàn Quốc nói Triều Tiên lại tiếp tục phóng tên lửa" [South Korea says North Korea launched missiles again]. Gia Lai TV (in Vietnamese). Gia Lai Newspaper and Radio, Television. 10 March 2025. Retrieved 29 March 2026.
- 1 2 Zwirko, Colin (13 August 2024). "North Korea secretly building missile launchers at obscure factory near capital". NK Pro. NK News. Retrieved 15 March 2026.
- ↑ Zwirko, Colin (10 January 2024). "Kim Jong Un visits missile launcher factory, demands 'flaws' in production fixed". NK News. Retrieved 4 January 2025.
- ↑ "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Major Munitions Factories". Minju Joson. 10 January 2024. Retrieved 21 March 2026.
- ↑ Uyên Phương (15 May 2024). "Ông Kim Jong Un thăm kho vũ khí, nói về quá trình chuẩn bị cho chiến tranh" [Kim Jong Un visits arsenal, talks about war preparations]. Tuổi Trẻ (in Vietnamese). Retrieved 29 March 2025.
- ↑ Van Diepen, Vann H. (29 May 2024). "North Korea Claims "Autonomous" Guidance and Big Deployments of Its New Small Solid SRBM". 38 North. Retrieved 4 January 2025.
- ↑ "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Learns about Production of Major Weapons and Equipment". Minju Joson. 15 May 2024. Retrieved 21 March 2026.
- ↑ Shin, Mitch (18 April 2022). "North Korea Tests Tactical Guided Weapon". The Diplomat. Retrieved 16 May 2026.
Based on the short distance and low altitude of the missiles' test flight, the North's "new-type tactical guided weapon" – which is likely to be a smaller type of the KN-23 SRBM – will be used to target South Korea when deployed.
- ↑ Eveleth, Decker (12 August 2024). "How North Korea's tactical missile deployment aggravates risks of nuclear use". NK Pro. NK News. Retrieved 15 March 2026.
- ↑ Vahidoğlu, Əhəd (5 August 2024). "Şimali Koreya Ordusuna çox sayda "Hwasong-11D" raket kompleksi tədarük edilib" [A large number of Hwasong-11D missile complexes have been supplied to the North Korean army]. Polyqon (in Azerbaijani). Retrieved 5 June 2025.
- ↑ Valerio, Mike; Seo, Yoonjung; Lendon, Brad (4 August 2024). "North Korea claims it's sending 250 new missile launchers toward the South Korean border". CNN. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
- ↑ "Bàn giao 250 bệ phóng tên lửa cho quân đội Triều Tiên" [Transferring 250 missile launchers to North Korean army]. Hanoi Radio Television (in Vietnamese). Hanoi Media Group. 5 August 2024. Retrieved 31 January 2026.