Reformists (Chinese Communist Party)

Reformists
Simplified Chinese改革派
Literal meaningReform faction
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinGǎigé pài

The Reformists were a loose political faction within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mainly active in the 1980s, and later referred more broadly to CCP members favoring market economy reforms.[1][2][3]

Etymology

The term "reform" originates from the policy of reform and opening up. In 1987, when Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the CCP Central Advisory Commission, met with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, he stated: "Some people abroad used to regard me as a reformist and others as a conservative. I am a reformist, that's true; but if adhering to the Four Cardinal Principles makes someone a conservative, then I am also a conservative. So to put it more accurately, I am a seeking-truth-from-factsist."[4][5]

On November 2, 1987, during a press conference at the 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang mentioned: "Some foreign friends always believe there is a reformist faction and a conservative faction in China, analyzing China's political situation based on the ebb and flow of these two factions."[6]

1980s

The period from the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee in 1978 to the abolition of the Central Advisory Commission at the 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1992 is often referred to as "dual-peak politics", characterized by elder politics led by Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun. Although this period is also called the "Reform Era" or the "Deng Xiaoping Era," Deng did not possess supreme power like Mao Zedong. In terms of seniority, Chen Yun was the only surviving member among the Five Secretaries after the Cultural Revolution, making his standing no less than Deng's. Thus, "Chen Yun and another group of CCP elders held their own opinions on Reform and Opening up, yet Deng could not suppress dissenting voices as Mao had handled Liu Shaoqi and others—including Deng himself."[7][8]

Deng Xiaoping leaned toward the reformist side, successively elevating Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang to General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, while Chen Yun leaned conservative. The Deng Xiaoping camp included Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, Hu Qili, Xi Zhongxun[9], Li Chang, Zhou Yang, Qiao Shi, Xiang Nan, Ren Zhongyi, Tian Jiyun, Yan Mingfu, Bao Tong, Li Rui, Hu Jiwei, Zhu Houze, Xie Tao, He Fang, Du Guang, Zhong Peizhang, Du Daozheng,[10] and Hu Deping.[11] The Chen Yun camp included Li Xiannian, Song Renqiong, Yao Yilin, Song Ping, Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo, Yu Qiuli, Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun, and Li Peng.[12][13]

Differences and conflicts between the two sides emerged over issues and events such as Special Economic Zones, the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign, the Campaign against Bourgeois Liberalization, the 1986 Chinese student demonstrations, political system reforms, the 13th CCP National Congress, the documentary River Elegy, the Death of Hu Yaobang, the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, debates over "socialist vs. capitalist" identity, and Deng Xiaoping's southern tour. Prior to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, a debate over "Neoauthoritarianism" erupted within the reformist camp.[14] While Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun shared no disagreement regarding maintaining the ruling position of the CCP during the 1989 protests, Chen advocated a "Bird-cage economy" while Deng favored a socialist market economy. Regarding foreign policy, some within the reformist faction believed that CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev failed because he pursued political reform without economic reform, implying that by focusing solely on economic reform rather than political reform, China could avoid a similar fate.

The CCP reformists supported small government, administrative decentralization, and the growth of the private sector over state enterprises ("state retreats, private advances"), whereas CCP conservatives supported big government, economic interventionism, and a planned economy.[15]

1990s

On February 18, 1991, the retired Deng Xiaoping visited the revolving restaurant on the 41st floor of the New Jin Jiang Hotel in Shanghai, instructing Zhu Rongji, then Secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee, saying: "I hope the people of Shanghai will be more emancipated in mind, bolder, and move faster." Zhu relayed Deng's remarks at a city cadre meeting, stating that 1991 was a "year of reform" and borrowing Cao Cao's line to say, "What can relieve our worries? Only reform." For this, Zhu was subtly branded by conservatives as "China's Gorbachev" and a "reformist taking the capitalist road."[16]

After the 14th CCP National Congress in 1992, the CCP Central Advisory Commission was abolished, and conservative figures like Chen Yun and Yao Yilin retired. The Jiang Zemin faction gradually formed and became the core of the third generation of CCP leadership, suppressing remaining conservative forces, pushing forward Reform and opening up, developing a socialist market economy, and leading China toward joining the WTO. With Deng Xiaoping's backing, Zhu Rongji leaped several levels at the 1st Plenary Session of the 14th CCP Central Committee, advancing from an alternate member of the Central Committee directly to a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.

According to The New York Times, after Chen Yun died in 1995, some within the party felt a sense of relief. An anonymous reformist official noted, "If Deng Xiaoping had died first, I think our entire reform process would have faced three years of stagnation."[17]

Qiao Shi had long been regarded as a reformist and an ally of Zhao Ziyang, with outside observers generally holding that he supported Zhao's stance of resolving the 1989 student movement through "democracy and the rule of law."[18] As Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress from 1993 to 1998, Qiao presided over the 1993 Constitutional Amendment, incorporating "the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics" and "adhering to reform and opening up" into the preamble, while adding "socialist market economy" and the "household contract responsibility system" into the main body.[19]

In 1998, Zhu Rongji succeeded Li Peng as Premier of the State Council, implementing drastic economic liberalization reforms during his tenure, including breaking the "three iron systems" in state-owned enterprises, corporate restructuring and market listing, offloading non-performing bank assets, entering the World Trade Organization, establishing a market economy framework, and reforming the tax-sharing system. Andrew Nathan argued that after Zhu Rongji, domestic reform in China became irreversible, and integrating China into the WTO made its economic alignment with the world equally irreversible. During his tenure, Zhu also promoted and appointed many reformist officials through the System Reform Office mechanism, including Wang Qishan, Zhou Xiaochuan, Wu Xiaoling, Li Jiange, Guo Shuqing, Lou Jiwei, and Long Yongtu.[20]

According to The Economist, "[s]cholars debate whether Jiang and Zhu really deserve their “reformist” labels. Political reformers they certainly were not: Communist Party elders chose them to reinforce party will and pick up the pieces following the Tiananmen trauma."[21]

2000s

External commentators have identified senior figures such as Li Ruihuan[22], Wen Jiabao[23], Liu He[2], Li Keqiang, Wang Yang[3], Li Qiang[24], and Li Yuanchao as reformists among the CCP leadership.[25]

Wen Jiabao had previously served under reformist leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. During the 1989 student movement, in his role as Director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, he accompanied then-General Secretary Zhao Ziyang to Tiananmen Square to visit hunger-striking students.[26] Hong Kong's Hong Kong Economic Journal reported that at the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2002, Zhu Rongji voluntarily offered his retirement in exchange for a voice in selecting the next Premier, strongly recommending Wen Jiabao to succeed him as Premier and preventing the Jiang Zemin faction's plan to have Li Changchun take the post. Wen Jiabao successfully succeeded Zhu Rongji as Premier in March 2003, while Li Changchun became the head of ideology.

In February 2007, Wen Jiabao published an article titled "Our Historical Tasks at the Primary Stage of Socialism and Several Issues Concerning China's Foreign Policy," stating that "Science, democracy, the rule of law, freedom, and human rights are not unique to capitalism; rather, they are common values pursued by humanity throughout long historical processes and common fruits of civilization."[27] The debate over universal values became the most significant controversy in Chinese media throughout 2008.[28][29] A report by Japan's Sankei Shimbun in Beijing noted that by the end of his term as Premier, Wen Jiabao had become the "largest reformist within the CCP."[23]

According to WikiLeaks, in November 2008, because the reformist journal Yanhuang Chunqiu repeatedly published articles mentioning former General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zemin feared his influence would be weakened or denied, demanding that Li Changchun, then member of the Politburo Standing Committee overseeing ideology, strictly handle the situation. The Ministry of Culture subsequently urged the magazine's staff to retire due to age. However, following intervention by then-General Secretary Hu Jintao, publisher Du Daozheng was able to remain in office.[30]

2010s

In September 2011, Zhu Rongji high-profile published a book aimed at confronting special interest groups within the CCP advocating a "farewell to reform." Zhu expressed that a growing special interest group opposed to reform was attacking, negating, alienating, and departing from the cause of Reform and opening up, setting up greater political and ideological barriers to stop reform and reverse China's future trajectory. Seeing a clear tendency away from or against reform, Zhu stated: "Facing this danger, I have no reason to stay silent."[31]

Japan's Mainichi Shimbun reported that reformist Premier Wen Jiabao, dissatisfied with conservative princeling Bo Xilai, expressed rare and fierce anger during a meeting with Hong Kong visitors in Beijing, stating that political reform in China was being hindered by remnants of feudalism and the toxic legacy of the Cultural Revolution. During the 2012 summer Beidaihe meeting, Japan's Kyodo News reported that more than 1,600 CCP conservative veteran cadres and scholars jointly petitioned the CCP Central Committee demanding the dismissal of reformist Premier Wen Jiabao, alleging that Wen had personally instructed the shutdown of conservative websites supporting Bo Xilai,[32] including Utopia.[33]

Among the members of the 18th CCP Politburo Standing Committee formed in autumn 2012, incoming Premier Li Keqiang was considered a rare reformist. In his youth, Li Keqiang translated the landmark treatise The Due Process of Law by famous British jurist Lord Denning.[34] Reuters reported that months before the 18th National Congress, under pressure from conservative elders, two reformist figures—Wang Yang (then Party Secretary of Guangdong) and Li Yuanchao (then Head of the Organization Department)—were sidelined, with the latter replaced by Yu Zhengsheng.[35] The 18th Congress was viewed as a "victory for political conservatism," with Jiang Zemin playing a major role in personnel arrangements.[36]

The New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof predicted in early 2013 that Xi Jinping would become a reformist leader, forecasting that Mao Zedong's body would be moved out of Tiananmen Square and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo would be released.[37][38] However, following the release of Document No. 9 (Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere) in 2013, outlets such as Deutsche Welle[39] and Mingjing News concluded that Xi was a conservative. Gao Wenqian noted that two Xi Jinpings existed: one carrying the blood of his father Xi Zhongxun, an open-minded figure within the party, and another as a successor to the communist "red empire," depending on which side would prevail.[37]

In the new Politburo Standing Committee produced by the 19th CCP National Congress in 2017, newly appointed member Wang Yang was viewed as a CCP reformist. Following the 1989 Tiananmen event, Wang Yang, then the 34-year-old mayor of Tongling, initiated a major discussion titled "Wake Up, Tongling," calling for mind emancipation and breaking away from ideological debates over capitalism vs. socialism, which earned him personal praise from Deng Xiaoping during his southern tour in 1992. In 1993, Wang was promoted to Vice Governor of Anhui Province, becoming the youngest vice governor in China at the time.[40]

After the 2018 constitutional amendment ended the policy of Abolition of the lifetime tenure system for leading cadres, several reformist CCP members were expelled from the party for opposing Xi Jinping's "Two Establishes", including former CCP Central Party School professor Cai Xia and "princeling" Ren Zhiqiang. Cai Xia remarked that following Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, there were still many within the party striving to push reform forward, such as Ren Zhiqiang.[41]

2020s

Following the 20th CCP National Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping broke convention to secure another term as CCP General Secretary, while reformist officials such as Premier Li Keqiang and CPPCC Chairman Wang Yang retired.[42]

In March 2023, Li Qiang succeeded Li Keqiang as Premier of the State Council. While perceived externally as leaning toward reform, Li Qiang was elevated directly by Xi Jinping and became the first Premier without prior work experience in central government or CCP organ leadership, remaining completely subordinate to Xi.

On July 15, 2024, the opening day of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee, Xinhua News Agency published a nearly 10,000-word profile titled Xi Jinping, the Reformer, describing Xi as "another outstanding reformer after Deng Xiaoping," whose "drive for reform stems from the expectations of the people," and noting that "Xi has a reformer's lineage."[43] This article was distributed exclusively to overseas outlets and was not provided via domestic wire services,[44] nor was it published on Xinhuanet or other domestic Chinese media.[45][46] Chinese-American analyst Cheng Xiaonong suggested that "it was likely pulled due to over-flattery and fear of backlash."[43]

See also

References

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