Pro-Beijing camp (Taiwan)

Pro-Beijing camp
臺灣親中共派
Founded1990s
IdeologyChinese unification
One country, two systems
Anti–Taiwan independence
Majority:
Conservatism (Taiwanese)
Factions:
Socialism
Political positionMajority:
Right-wing to far-right[1]
Factions:
Left-wing
OpponentsPan-Green Coalition
Taiwan Go Go
Pro-Beijing camp
Chinese臺灣親中共派
Literal meaningTaiwan's pro-Communist factions
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinTáiwān qīnzhònggòngpài
Wade–GilesT'ai2-wan1 ch'in1-chung1-kung4-p'ai4
Southern Min
Hokkien POJTâi-oân chhin-tiong-kiōng-phài
Alternative Chinese name
Chinese急統派
Literal meaningRadical pro-unification faction
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinJítǒngpài
Wade–GilesChi2-t'ung3-p'ai4
Southern Min
Hokkien POJKip-thóng-phài

The pro-Beijing camp or pro-PRC camp refers to groups or individuals in Taiwan that is friendly to the People's Republic of China (PRC), supports the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and is oriented toward Chinese unification under the CCP. The CCP uses both carrots and sticks to strengthen pro-Beijing political forces in Taiwan to form a "united front"; while threatening war with Taiwan, it also provides opportunities for commercial and cultural exchange.

Overview

Both the pro-Beijing camp and the pan-Blue Coalition support "One China"; while the pan-Blue Coalition defines the Republic of China as "One China", but reject unification under the PRC, the pro-Beijing camp recognize the People's Republic of China as the definition of "One China" and the CCP as the rightful ruler of Taiwan. However, some political parties, such as the pro-Beijing New Party, do not deny the Republic of China and support peaceful unification with the People's Republic of China, with both sides pursuing either a confederation or a Hong Kong/Macau political model.

In 2022, the Director of Taiwan's National Security Bureau stated that the Chinese Communist Party provides training to local online influencers as part of its "cognitive warfare" for political propaganda.[2] In 2023, the Republic of China's Mainland Affairs Council stated in a report that the CCP was increasing its cross-strait propaganda efforts in Taiwan through cognitive warfare.[3]

According to Sinologist Gerry Groot, the erosion of the "one country, two systems" framework in Hong Kong had a profound impact on Taiwan's political landscape. Following the 2020 enactment of the National Security Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress—a response to mass demonstrations and dissent in Hong Kong—Groot argues that the "clear and effective end of Hong Kong's judicial independence" occurred twenty-seven years ahead of schedule. This perceived abrogation of CCP promises was closely observed in Taiwan, where it "made the work of the tiny minority of pro-unification activists even harder and reinforced the skepticism of others regarding the value of CCP promises." Furthermore, Groot notes that these developments in Hong Kong played a crucial role in the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election, aiding the re-election of Tsai Ing-wen while undermining the campaign of the Kuomintang candidate, Han Kuo-yu.[4]

The organized crime groups in Taiwan, driven by financial incentives also support the PRC unification efforts.[5][6]

Political stance

In Taiwanese political standards, Taiwanese–Chinese nationalism has been regarded as right/conservative and Taiwan independence movement as left/progressive; the pro-Beijing camp is also called the "radical pro-unification factions" (急統派) and is considered "far-right" (極右); because the PRC is a one-party dictatorship and authoritarian nationalist regime as Taiwan is a liberal democracy.[1] Individuals or groups belonging to pro-Beijing camp are often referred to as "anti-American",[7][8] sometimes as "anti-Japanese"[9] and "anti-South Korean".[10][11]

Political parties

Kuomintang continues to be opposed to communism, as anti-communism is written under Article 2 of Kuomintang's party charter. However, some politicians, including Hung Hsiu-chu, are classified as "pro-Beijing".[12][13] Although the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) positions itself as a centrist party, its cooperative relationship with the PRC has prompted belief that it aligns more closely with conservatism.[14][15]

Prominent individuals

Notes

  1. ↑ Not to be confused with the Democratic Progressive Party, a pro–Taiwan independence group.
  2. ↑ It is the day the Patriot Alliance Association (PAA) was founded as a political party; the PAA was founded as a political organization in November 12, 1993.

References

  1. 1 2 蕭嘉弘 (2018-09-21). "台灣急統派不是民主極右勢力！". 民報 Taiwan People News. Archived from the original on 2023-06-18.
  2. ↑ "Some Taiwanese Youtubers on CCP payroll: intelligence chief". Focus Taiwan. Retrieved 2022-05-17.
  3. ↑ "China to increase 'united front' efforts: MAC report". Taipei Times. 2023-05-16. Retrieved 2023-05-19.
  4. ↑ Groot, Gerry (October 19, 2022). "The Life and Death of United Front Promises From Revolution to (Re)-Unification Past, Present and Future". China Brief. Jamestown. Retrieved October 19, 2022.
  5. ↑ Purbrick, Martin (September 5, 2025). "Criminal Organizations as Vectors of Influence in Taiwan". China Brief. Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved September 11, 2025.
  6. ↑ Purbrick, Martin (June 7, 2025). "Hongmen Associations Have Links to United Front and Organized Crime". China Brief. Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved September 11, 2025.
  7. ↑ Cole, J. Michael (23 June 2015). "The Strange Case of the KMT's Hung Hsiu-chu". The Diplomat. Retrieved 16 June 2026. The 67-year-old deputy speaker of the legislature, whose wild pronouncements in recent weeks have earned her comparisons with Sarah Palin, has also displayed an anti-American streak which is rather unusual for a party that has enjoyed decades of close relationship with the U.S. Days after Hung's opponent, Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), returned from a 12-day, six-city visit to the U.S., Hung very vocally expressed her lack of interest in embarking on a similar visit, and went as far as humiliating KMT Chairman Chu by contradicting him on the matter.
  8. ↑ Roy, Denny (30 April 2026). "Taiwan's Cheng will face a tough crowd on US visit". Asia Times. Retrieved 16 June 2026. There is a schism within the KMT over Taiwan's grand strategy. Cheng represents the party faction that is relatively pro-Beijing and anti-American.
  9. ↑ 高橋, 正成 (19 April 2026). "台湾･国民党は中国共産党と｢反日｣で協調するのか？訪中時に相次ぐ｢反日発言｣で鄭麗文･党主席が狙うもの" [Will Taiwan and the Kuomintang cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party on anti-Japanese sentiment? A series of "anti-Japanese remarks" during his visit to China are aimed at by party leader Cheng Li-wun]. Toyo Keizai Online (in Japanese). Retrieved 16 June 2026.
  10. ↑ "[대만] 외교부 "북이전 강행"…극우단체선 반한집회" [[Taiwan] Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "pushing for the transfer of (nuclear waste) to North (Korea)”... far-right groups hold anti-South Korean rallies]. The Chosun Ilbo (in Korean). January 27, 1997. Retrieved June 28, 2026. 대만의 극우단체인 「중화민국 애국동심회」 회원 10여명은 이날 주타이베이 한국 대표부가 있는 국제무역센터 빌딩 앞에 모여 대통령 허수아비와 태극기화형식을 갖고 처음으로 한국에 대해 항의를 표시했다. [About 10 members of the "Republic of China Patriot Alliance Association," a far-right group in Taiwan, gathered in front of the International Trade Center building—where the South Korean Representative Office in Taipei is located—and staged a protest against South Korea by burning a scarecrow representing the South Korean president and the Taegeukgi.]
  11. ↑ "They Used to be Anti-Communist, but Now They Play to Beijing's Tune". 25 October 2018.
  12. 1 2 "Taiwan's ruling party replaces pro-Beijing candidate Hung Hsiu-chu". CNBC. 19 October 2015.
  13. 1 2 "The Strange Case of the KMT's Hung Hsiu-chu". The Diplomat. 23 June 2015. With the more moderate members of the KMT seemingly standing by, Hung has forged ahead with a radical pro-Beijing policy that has much in common with the pro-unification New Party.
  14. ↑ "獨家／無視黨內規範？白中央委員再赴海峽論壇黨內震怒 民眾黨將移送中評會". FTNN新聞網. 2025-06-21.
  15. ↑ "民眾黨指「大陸地區」非外國 吳思瑤批：黃國昌能到北京人大咆哮？". Newtalk新聞網. 2025-08-12.
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