Battle of Moyale (1940)

Battle of Moyale (1940)
Part of Northern front, East Africa, 1940
Marsabit–Moyale Road, the route used by the British Army for evacuation during the Battle of Moyale
Date 1−15 July 1940 Location Moyale, modern Ethiopia 3.527°N 39.056°E / 3.527; 39.056 Result Italian victory Territorial changes Annexation into Italian East Africa
Belligerents
Kingdom of Italy Africa	United Kingdom India
Commanders and leaders
Duke of Aosta Luigi Frusci	Douglas Dickinson Charles Fowkes
Units involved
Royal Corps of Colonial Troops	5th Infantry Division King's African Rifles
Strength
200–300 Bande 2,000 Eritreans 20 light tanks 20 A.F.Vs. 1,000 reinforcements	Unknown

The Battle of Moyale (July 1940) also known as Capture of Moyale (Battaglia di Moyale) was a military operation on the Northern African Front of the World War II. The Italian Royal Corps of Colonial Troops forced the British troops to retreat from Moyale by capturing the fort. The British organised an evacuation of Moyale Fort, Moyale was occupied on 15 July while the British retreated by 17 July 1940.

Prelude

Before the Italian declaration of war, Mussolini intended a defensive strategy in Africa Orientale Italiana (AOI) with tactical offensives to protect Eritrea by attacking French Somaliland (Côte française des Somalis, now Djibouti) and conducting limited attacks on Sudan. The Italian army in the AOI had one metropolitan division, the equivalent of two more European divisions, that were short of heavy weapons and transport and seven understrength colonial divisions. A force was concentrated near the Sudan border for an attack on Kassala, comprising two colonial brigades, four squadrons of cavalry, approximately 24 light and tanks and armoured vehicles and ten batteries of artillery.

Background

On the Italian declaration of war on 10 June 1940, East Africa Force (Lieutenant-General Douglas Dickinson) comprised two East African brigades of the African troops organised as a Northern Brigade and a Southern Brigade with a reconnaissance regiment, a light artillery battery and the 22nd Mountain Battery, Royal Indian Artillery (RIA). By March 1940, the KAR strength had reached 883 officers, 1,374 non-commissioned officers and 20,026 African other ranks. Wavell ordered Dickinson to defend Kenya and to pin down as many Italian troops as possible. Dickinson planned to defend Mombasa and to deny a crossing of the Tana River and the fresh water at Wajir with the African troops.

Detachments were to be placed at Marsabit, Moyale and at Turkana, an arc 850 mi (1,370 km) long. The Italians were thought to have troops at Kismayo, Mogadishu, Dolo, Moyale and Yavello, which turned out to be colonial troops and bande, with two brigades at Jimma, ready to reinforce Moyale or attack Lake Rudolf and then invade Uganda. A Coastal Division and a Northern Frontier District Division had been planned but then the 11th (African) Division and the 12th (African) Division were created instead.

On 1 June, the first South African unit arrived at the port of Mombasa in Kenya. Each South African brigade group consisted of three rifle battalions, an armoured car company and signal, engineer and medical units. By July, under the terms of a war contingency plan, the 2nd (West Africa) Infantry Brigade, from the Gold Coast (now Ghana) and the 1st (West Africa) Infantry Brigade from Nigeria, were provided for service in Kenya by the (RWAFF). The 1st (West African) Brigade, the two KAR brigades and some South African units, formed the 11th (African) Division. The 12th (African) Division had a similar formation with the 2nd (West African) Brigade.At dawn on 17 June, the Rhodesians, supported a raid by the SDF on the Italian desert outpost of El Wak in Italian Somaliland about 90 mi (140 km) north-east of Wajir. The Rhodesians bombed and burnt down thatched mud huts and generally harassed Italian troops. Since the main fighting at that time was against Italian advances towards Moyale in Kenya, the Rhodesians concentrated there. On 1 July, Moyale, on the edge of the Ethiopian escarpment, where the tracks towards Wajir and Marsabit meet, was attacked.

Italian Moyale

Bande were used in colonial troops by the European powers in 1910s.

Moyale was occupied by the Italians and Britain. Italian Moyale had 200–300 Bande colonial troops. Even though small skirmishes took place at Italian Moyale, there was no big engagement. During the end of the June there were reports of the arrival of Italian reinforcements at Moyale. The reinforcements were later estimated to consist of three Colonial battalions, four Bande and a artillery pack brigade. An invasion of Moyale was planned by the British.

It was essential to relieve the anticipated Italian pressure on the French at Jibouti, and as administrative difficulties prevented an advance on Kismayu, Italian Moyale must be attacked instead.

— Douglas Dickinson

Advance on Moyale

The British and 1st African Rifles of the King's African Regiments (Major Drummond) objected to Moyale. A former sergeant of the British African units residing within the boundaries of Italy reported to Drummond that approximately 2,000 Eritreans had joined the Italian garrison at Moyale, as well as 20 light tanks and armoured vehicles, and nearly 1,000 reinforcements were anticipated to join the Italian garrison at Moyale before the end of the first week in July. On 30 June, reports from British scouts indicated that the Italian, inflicts were advancing in a north-easterly direction on British Moyale. The Italian Army launched an artillery attack on Moyale beginning on 1 July.

Battle

A ground assault on Moyale, involving almost 1,000 infantry, occurred shortly after the bombardment. The first Italian assault was repelled. On the morning of the first assault, at 10:30 a.m., the Italians then attacked again and got to within approximately 200 yards (approximately 180m) of the British defenses before they retreated to their original positions. During the morning and afternoon period, there continued to be intermittent gunfire, mortars, and small arms; approximately 350 shells were fired at Moyale fort, however, as the majority of them did not explode, the damage was minimal.

When the news of attack reached the British, C Company was sent through Buna and by 2 July reached the Moyale aerodrome. The remaining battalion under the command of Major Macnab reached Moyale and conferred with Drummond. While D Company and the KAR took post, they came under severe artillery-fire. After a few days of irregular shelling, there was a lull and Major Macnab sent relief to Fannanyatta where engineers were setting up pumps and water tanks. Patrols from Moyale noticed thousands of empty cartridges and grenade caps outside the wire. Troops within the fort were digging in and fortifying their positions, as well as cleaning out a duck pond next to the D.C.'s house so they could bathe again.

On 8 July Charles Fowkes visited the KAR; thirty shells fell upon Moyale that day, destroying one rifle and a gas mask. Except on the eastern face the area was surrounded by section posts, with a long communication trench leading to two pill-boxes on a slight rise overlooking the dukas. With D Company (Captain Henderson) moving into the fort on 9 July to relieve A Company, the latter bivouacked at the foot of the scarp for the night. They were not to return to Fannanyatta. At 5.40 a.m. on 10 July, the Italians brought down an intense concentration upon Moyale, first with artillery and then with rifles and automatic weapons. A Company climbed back up the escarpment to occupy the well area but as they neared their objective, they were pinned down by Artillery and small-arms fire. Drummond was wounded in the head and died later.

B Company counter-attacked in support the British up to the Mandera road junction, against Italian fire that was more accurate during this time. Significant damage was done to the defences, causing one Bren gun to be destroyed. Four Askari were killed and seven were wounded. There were also sight of Italian troops concentrating around Italian Moyale, in the bush on the west side and in the old Banda camp, and at Harbor. These troops, having had cover from artillery, began moving closer to the British fort.

Later in July the KAR were stationed at Habasewin before marching towards Buna. Captain Blackie (B Company, 1st KAR]]) went into the occupation of the second ('Lone tree') ridge after being supported with fire from the first ridge at 12:30 p.m., 2,000 yd (1,800 m) south of Moyale. Italian troops were reported to be in strong positions at the crest of the ridge, with much small-arms and artillery-fire being directed upon them. B Company could not advance and at night or dusk had to withdraw to the first ridge.

On 12 July the garrison of the fort, who had been cut off from their wells, had enough fresh water for about another six days. There was no longer room in the fort to take in any more wounded. The movement of troops could be observed on the whole length of the escarpment and made it evident that the British were almost surrounded. During the night of 12/13 July, many British convoys could be seen lighting up from the movement of large numbers of Italian troops en route to join the British troops.

Evacuation

The evacuation of Moyale Fort came to a halt on 13 July when the 5th KAR reached Fannanyatta (from Wajir) to cover the withdrawal. Orders were issued to Henderson for the fort to be evacuated that night. Preparatory steps were taken during the day, with the 1st KAR moving into the area near the Mandera road junction and the 1st/6th KAR. holding its position on top of the escarpment (supported by the arrival of B Company from Marsabit).

Once it was dark, A and B Companies of the 5th KAR began to move from their location towards the fort to cover the withdrawal of the troops. They were within a few hundred yards of the fort when they lost contact with each other and had to withdraw around midnight. They found out later that Henderson had not received the evacuation order. The next day communication was re-established with Moyale and it was agreed that the garrison would leave the fort at night (July 14/15) and would be supported by the 5th KAR on the withdrawal of 1st KAR and the 1st/6the KAR from the area.

A volunteer patrol comprising six Europeans and 20 Askari departed from Dobell under Captain Robson with the intent to engage the enemy on Lone Tree Ridge should the alarm be sounded while the garrison was evacuating. The Europeans were dressed in rubber boots while the Askari were barefoot, and carried their rifles and ammunition. Everything that could be destroyed before the departure was destroyed. The patrol moved quietly between the enemy's picket lines, hearing them conversing from both directions, and descended the escarpment to safety. The total number of casualties in the first attack at Moyale is 10 killed, approximately 35 wounded and 9 missing.

Three severely injured soldiers were left behind at the Fort. One of them was located by the Reconnaissance Squadron's patrol on the 15th July. He indicated to them that another askari had escaped from the Fort and was hiding in the maize near Moyale. D Company, 5th KAR searched for the Askari until the late afternoon and on the following morning, a platoon of A Company moved into an area near the escarpment, while five African volunteers attempted to find the maize one more time but this time the enemy was encountered in more strength and so the attempt had to be terminated. The 5th KAR returned to Dobel, where they established a position on the Moyale road across the Moyale−Juba road.

Aftermath

The Italians didn't made any efforts to take the advantage of their victory. In spite of the overwhelming force they had brought against Moyale, the morale of their troops was not impressive and they lacked initiative. On the other hand, Henderson reported that the spirits of his own men, though low at first, had mounted daily, until at the end his Askari were sorry to leave. In his opinion, if Lone Tree Ridge had been occupied a week earlier and the wells protected, the Italians might have been held permanently at bay. Luigi Frusci was ordered to retire from Kassala and Metemma in the lowlands along the Eritrea–Sudan border and hold the mountain passes on the Kassala–Agordat and Metemma–Gondar roads. Frusci chose not to withdraw from the lowlands, because withdrawal would involve too great a loss of prestige and because Kassala was an important railway junction; holding it prevented the British from using the railway to carry supplies from Port Sudan to their base at Gedaref. Information on the Italian withdrawal plan was quickly decrypted by the British and Platt begin his offensive into Eritrea on 18 January 1941, three weeks early.

References

Bibliography

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Further reading

• Raugh, H. E. (1993). Wavell in the Middle East, 1939–1941: A Study in Generalship (1st ed.). London: Brassey's UK. ISBN 978-0-08-040983-2.
• Stewart, A. (2016). The First Victory: The Second World War and the East Africa Campaign (1st ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-20855-9.