Adoption law

[My View]

Same-Sex Marriage

Actually, I don't oppose same-sex marriage, nor do I exclude gay friends. Comrade Xi Jinping and Comrade Xiaoping are good friends of everyone. What I want to know is, in a free market, will a legally recognized demand lead to a legally recognized supply? For example, if it is known that same-sex couples cannot have children but must adopt to continue the lineage, then adoption is a legally recognized necessary supply. Should subsequent legalization of the sale of infants and the prevention of black market human trafficking be implemented? I believe relevant supporting measures should be formulated simultaneously, because a legally recognized demand must have a corresponding supply. This supply is formulated to protect human rights and simultaneously protects demand, and the counterpart of the supply is also a human right. The law should protect both parties, not just one. Monogamous marriage has no third-party involvement and therefore does not require additional provisions for marriage outside the marriage. However, same-sex marriage inevitably involves the rights of a third party. Since the spirit of marriage lies in the union to continue life, adoption can also fulfill this spirit.

Since adoption aligns with the spirit of marriage, both heterosexual and same-sex couples, being of the two sexes, are considered to conform to the spirit of marriage and should naturally be subject to adoption without exclusion or inequality. However, to protect the rights of third parties, provisions should be simultaneously established for the protection of the rights and human rights of adopted children through methods such as gifting, sale, trust, and auction (Interpretation No. 587), and these provisions should be formulated and implemented simultaneously in a legal manner involving both parties, not just one.

I can choose to be heterosexual or homosexual, but children cannot choose their parents. How can we ensure that the gifting, sale, trust, and auction of infant products (as stipulated in Article 6 of the Civil Code) meet the requirements of legalizing same-sex marriage while providing relative protection for adopted children, thus adhering to the principle of mutual legal protection? This is because the buying and selling of people is prohibited, yet human trafficking is impossible to eradicate due to demand. This problem has existed in various countries and regions throughout history, varying only in degree. Legalizing same-sex marriage necessitates ensuring the supply chain and preventing the black market from flourishing. Therefore, legalizing the gifting, sale, trust, and auction of these products is a crucial aspect of the principle of mutual legal protection. I urge relevant government agencies to amend the provisions regarding adoption in the Civil Code to simultaneously uphold this principle, in order to conform to the spirit of legislation and protect the rights of third parties.

If referendums and popular votes result in allowing the buying and selling of people meeting legal requirements, then the buying and selling of people becomes legal, and the Constitution can be burned, because it does not conform to public opinion and the needs of the times.

Article 6

Human legal capacity begins at birth and ends at death.

[III. The Basis for Constitutional Review of Legislative Inaction]

Partial Coordination Opinion on Interpretation No. 747, submitted by Grand Justice Lin Chun-yi:

Constitutional Review of Legislative Inaction Regarding the constitutional review of insufficient norms governing legislative inaction, this Court has issued several interpretations. Interpretation No. 477 states: "If a right suffers equal harm and is entitled to restitution, but this is not stipulated, considering the nature of the matter, there is no reason to make such a differential treatment, which is clearly a major flaw in legislation." However, it does not point out the basis for constitutional review of legislative inaction, which is extremely regrettable. Interpretation No. 708 criticizes Article 38, Paragraph 1 of the Immigration and Exit Act for failing to provide immediate judicial relief to those temporarily detained and for making decisions that are not subject to court review, both of which violate the intent of Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of the people. Interpretation No. 709, based on the constitutional requirement of due process of administration, points out the legislator's constitutional obligations and, through judicial review, finds that the Urban Renewal Act "failed to establish appropriate organizations," "failed to ensure stakeholders were informed," and "failed to stipulate public hearings," all of which are inconsistent with the constitutional intent.

Interpretation No. 710 criticizes Article 18 of the Act Governing Relations between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, stating that it "does not grant temporary detainees immediate judicial relief" and "is not subject to review and decision by the court," both of which violate the constitutional principle of due process and are inconsistent with Article 8 of the Constitution's guarantee of personal freedom. Interpretation No. 737, based on the principle of substantive due process in Articles 8 and 16 of the Constitution, points out that Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates: "Defense counsel may examine case files and evidence during the trial and may copy or photograph them." Article 101, Paragraph 3 of the same law stipulates: "The facts upon which each paragraph of Paragraph 1 is based shall be informed to the defendant and his defense counsel and recorded in the minutes." Overall, criminal suspects and their defense counsel during investigations are only informed of the facts upon which the reasons for detention are based, which is inconsistent with the above intent. Interpretation No. 739, based on the constitutional principle of due process, points out that the legislator's constitutional obligation to act is to fail to specify the ratio of the total land area of ​​all initiators within the proposed rezoning area to the total land area within the proposed rezoning area when applying for the establishment of a preparatory committee under Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Regulations Governing Urban Land Rezoning. Furthermore, when there are seven or more initiators, the interpretation fails to specify the ratio of their number to the total number of land owners within the proposed rezoning area, thus violating the constitutional principle of due process. Based on the precedent set forth above, it can be confirmed that the Court's criteria for reviewing the constitutionality of legislative inaction are as follows: (i) first, confirming that the legislator has a constitutional obligation to act; (ii) then declaring that the norms governing legislative inaction are insufficient and inconsistent with the constitutional intent of protecting rights; (iii) finally, calling on the legislator to review and amend the relevant articles to ensure proper provision. The review process and results of this interpretation are examined based on the above review criteria. Firstly, according to Article 143 of the Constitution: "The land ownership rights acquired by the people according to law shall be protected and restricted by law." Article 15 of the Constitution, concerning the protection of people's property rights, aims to ensure that individuals exercise their rights to freely use, profit from, and dispose of their property according to its existing state, and are free from infringement by public power or third parties, so as to realize individual freedom, develop personality, and maintain dignity. From the perspective of the constitutional rights protection norms mentioned above, legislators should legally guarantee the people's right to freely use, profit from, and dispose of land according to its existing state, and to be free from infringement by public power or third parties. This is the legislator's constitutional obligation to act. If the legislator fails to act, resulting in a serious infringement of the people's constitutionally protected rights, and if the legislative inaction lacks justifiable reasons, the interpreter has the right, according to the constitutional intent, to confirm the legislator's constitutional obligation to act, and to declare that the relevant provisions of such inadequate regulations are inconsistent with the constitutional intent, and to call on the relevant authorities to review the appropriateness of the relevant regulations. In other words, the interpreter can still conduct constitutional review of legislative inaction. Regarding the intent of this constitutional interpretation petition, the disputed provision one only stipulates that the Ministry of the Interior has the authority to approve expropriation of land or land improvements, and the person requesting expropriation is the land user. Before legally requesting the state to exercise the power of expropriation, the land user must reach an agreement with the owner; this is a statutory prerequisite for applying for expropriation. Therefore, the agreement between the land user and the owner, and the application for expropriation by the Ministry of the Interior, before applying to the Ministry of the Interior, constitute an internal administrative act to initiate the expropriation decision by the Ministry of the Interior, and are considered administrative actions. As for the disputed provision two, it only stipulates that the land user may acquire surface rights by agreement regarding the area of ​​the land to be used; if no agreement is reached, the expropriation provisions may be applied to acquire "surface rights." Regarding Article 57, Paragraph 2 of the same regulations, which stipulates that landowners may claim compensation for "land use for business purposes" under the preceding paragraph, the following is relevant: Regarding Interpretation No. 610 of this Court, the dissenting opinion jointly submitted by Grand Justices Peng Feng-zhi and Hsu Pi-hu states: "Insufficient regulations are a form of legislative inaction. To determine whether legislative inaction is unconstitutional, it is necessary to first confirm that the legislator has a constitutional obligation to act. If the insufficient regulations constitute excessive restrictions on rights, or even if they do not constitute restrictions on rights but violate the equal protection of rights, the interpreter, in accordance with the constitutional intent, declares that the overall state of the insufficient regulations is inconsistent with the constitutional intent and confirms that the legislator has a constitutional obligation to act; otherwise, depending on the circumstances, the legislator should be urged to review the appropriateness of the relevant regulations or declare the overall state of the regulations constitutional. The constitutional basis for review is the constitutional rights protection norms related to the purpose of the petition," which can be used as a reference. When the construction of a project under Article 9 renders the land unusable for its intended purpose, the owner may request the landowner to requisition the "land ownership rights." A comprehensive review of Articles 1 and 2, and Article 57, Paragraph 2, reveals that when the construction of a project under Article 3 affects the landowner's land development security and utilization, but has not yet rendered it unusable for its intended purpose, the legislator has failed to specify whether the landowner may request the landowner to requisition the "superficial rights." This legislative inaction and insufficient regulation contradict the constitutional intent of protecting people's property rights. Furthermore, since the relevant regulations were enacted and promulgated on February 2, 1989, the relevant authorities have not reviewed or amended them. This legislative inaction, which violates legislative obligations, has continued for a considerable period of time without justifiable reason. Compared with several similar systems (Article 57, Paragraph 2 of the Land Expropriation Act, Article 216, Paragraph 1 of the Land Act, Article 19, Paragraph 3 of the Mass Rapid Transit Act, Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the Common Pipeline Act, and Article 19, Paragraph 2 of the Act for Encouraging Private Participation in Transportation Construction, etc.), the protection of landowners in this case is clearly inadequate. The legislative inaction of not granting landowners the right to request the land user to apply to the competent authority for the expropriation of their land rights constitutes insufficient protection of people's property rights. This is the majority opinion, and the review method of Interpretation No. 737 of this Court is cited again, adopting the "overall observation" review approach. 6. Individually, either provision one or two in dispute may not be unconstitutional. However, considering provisions one and two as a whole, they result in insufficient regulation, which is inconsistent with the constitutional intent of protecting people's property rights. This court agrees with this conclusion of unconstitutionality review.

Regarding the effect of this interpretation, since this interpretation only declares provisions one and two in dispute... 4. The dissenting opinion jointly submitted by Justices Chen Chunsheng, Chi Chi-ming, and Huang Hsi-chun in Interpretation No. 694 of this Court states: "Currently, the academic and practical communities generally acknowledge that legislative inaction can also be subject to judicial review. However, the requirements for legislative inaction are stricter than those for legislation, such as the existence of a legislative obligation and the violation of the legislative obligation must continue for a considerable period of time." This can be used as a reference. 5. In Interpretation No. 683 of this Court, Justice Hsu Tsung-li's joint opinion states: "We can still directly trace back to the principle of proportionality in a rule-of-law state, weighing the severity of the infringement of fundamental rights involved in legislative inaction against the legitimate reasons for such inaction." This can be used as a reference. 6. In Interpretation No. 737 of this Court, Justice Su Yung-chin's joint opinion states: "Looking at the information access that the two articles can satisfy as a whole, it is determined that the information access granted to the suspect and his/her defense counsel by the two articles combined fails to meet the minimum constitutional requirements. Declaring the two articles unconstitutional together does not include a constitutional judgment on any single article. This interpretation neither confirms that Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is unconstitutional, nor does it confirm that Article 101, Paragraph 3 is unconstitutional." This can be used as a reference. 10. The existing regulations are inadequate, and the parts they originally govern remain valid. Therefore, this interpretation orders the relevant authorities to amend the law to fill the gaps. Within one year of the promulgation of this interpretation, the Land Expropriation Act should be amended to properly stipulate the provisions based on the intent of this interpretation. As for which article of the Land Expropriation Act to be amended, this is a matter of legislative discretion. If the relevant authorities fail to complete the amendment within the stipulated time, to avoid the original regulations also losing their effect, it is hereby declared that the right of landowners to request the land user to apply to the competent authority for the expropriation of the surface rights should be carried out in accordance with the intent of this interpretation. This Chairperson also agrees with the majority opinion calling for proper legislative amendment.

[IV. Reference for Adoption Regulations]

The legislation does not restrict the legal marriage or the heterosexual or same-sex union of the adoptive parents, and aims to make individuals adopted children. Its initial intention was to uphold human rights through democratic rule of law and democratic protection. While laws are revised to protect human rights based on acquired behaviors and ideologies, the law should also prioritize the protection of the inherent and objective rights of those born into the family. The following five points represent the minimum legal protections that should be provided to adopted children:

(I) The legal marriage must have lasted for more than five years, and the legal marriage must have continued for another five years after the adoption.

(II) At least one of the adoptive parents must be an adopted child.

(III) The adopted child has the right to know their lineage.

(IV) If, after confirmation, the adoptive parents fail to fulfill their parental obligations, the adopted child is not obligated to support them and can file a lawsuit against their biological and adoptive parents for any infringement of their human rights. (v) If no complaint is filed but the case is confirmed by another party, it is considered a public prosecution. The biological parents, adoptive parents, and surrogate mothers (including those involved in IVF or maternal surrogacy) who have related rights, obligations, and interests arising from the adoptee are jointly liable. If, after confirmation, the adoptive parents fail to fulfill their obligations, resulting in the adoptee being clearly mistreated or harmed, leading to the adoptee's death, their legal marriage is invalid, and both adoptive parents are sentenced to death. Those jointly liable are accomplices and, depending on the severity of their responsibility, will be sentenced to a minimum of ten years imprisonment, which cannot be commuted to a fine or parole.

「收養關係直接是婚姻的子法（或延伸制度），既然釋字第 748 號已經宣告民法婚姻未保障同性是規範不足的違憲，那麼涉及配偶核心權益的『收養制度』，理應在兩年內一併進行違憲審查與修正，不該脫鉤。」

For a range of related articles, see Category:Adoption law.

Adoption application forms.

Adoption law is the generic area of legal theory, policy making, legal practice and legal studies relating to law on adoption.

National adoption laws

National, or domestic, adoption laws deal with issues such as step-parent adoption, adoption by cohabitees, adoption by single parents and LGBT adoption. Adoption laws in some countries may be affected by religious considerations such as adoption in Islam.

Specific laws

Laws vary widely from country to country and in the likes of United States, from state to state.

Intercountry adoption laws

Main article: International adoption

Intercountry adoption laws vary widely.