1987 Aegean crisis

1987 Aegean Crisis
Part of Aegean Dispute

Map of the Aegean Sea
Location
Aegean Sea
Parties involved in crisis
Greece Turkey

The Aegean crisis (Greek: Κρίση στο Αιγαίο, romanized: Krísi sto Aigaío, Turkish: Ege kıta sahanlığı krizi) of March 1987 was a confrontation between Turkey and Greece arising from a miscommunication over Greek intentions to conduct oil exploration in the Aegean Sea, near the Greek island of Thasos.

Greece sought to prevent oil companies from drilling beyond its territorial waters and declared the purchase of majority shares of these companies. Soon after, one of these companies, the Canadian company Denison Mines, announced plans to drill east of Thasos beyond the Greek waters. Turkey interpreted these actions as an indication that Greece intended to expand its oil exploration beyond those waters. Following a request for clarification, a miscommunication occurred between the Greek deputy foreign minister and the Turkish ambassador. The tension was amplified by the absence of a direct channel of communication between the two governments. In response, a Turkish survey vessel was sent to the area with an escort of two Turkish warships, which led both nations to place their military forces on high alert. The situation alarmed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as both countries were members of the alliance.

Diplomats intervened and resolved the misunderstanding. Turkey withdrew its naval vessels under the condition that Greece would not establish oil drills in the north Aegean Sea beyond its territorial waters. A diplomatic rapprochement followed with a meeting between the prime ministers Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal in Davos the following year. The meeting launched the Davos process, aimed at easing tensions in Greek-Turkish relations. However, internal opposition in both countries tarnished the progress achieved in Davos.

Contemporary Greek–Turkish relations

(Left) Current territorial waters recognized by Greece and Turkey, and airspace as recognized by Turkey. (Right) 12 nmi: Extent of territorial waters and national airspace defined as a legal right by UNCLOS, to which Greece is a signatory, and Turkey is not.

Greek–Turkish relations have been marked by recurring internal and external tensions stemming from Turkey's revisionist strategy to challenge the status quo in the Aegean Sea as established by the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947). According to scholar Panayotis Tsakonas, Turkey's strategy relies on calibrated coercion, maintaining sustained political and military pressure below the threshold of war to redefine the regional balance of rights and influence in the Aegean Sea.[1] On the other side, scholar Mustafa Aydın argues that Turkey fears Greece's effort to turn the Aegean Sea into a "Greek lake." Greece is a signatory of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which grants the right to expand its territorial waters from six to twelve miles[a] around its islands. If this was to occur, Turkish ports in the Aegean and Black Sea would access the high seas only through waters under Greek sovereignty and jurisdiction.[2] Turkey is not a signatory of UNCLOS and has declared that such an extension by Greece would constitute a casus belli (cause of war).[2][3][4]

Map of the Aegean Sea showing the demilitarization status based on the relevant treaties
Islands by demilitarization status

The tensions between the two countries culminated in the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The invasion followed a coup backed by the Greek junta (1967–1974), which sought Enosis—the union of Cyprus with Greece.[5] Turkey's military intervention, concerned over the Turkish Cypriot minority, led to the occupation of the northern 37% of the island, the displacement of a significant Greek Cypriot population, and the enduring division of Cyprus.[6][7] This outcome created lasting friction between the two NATO allies. Diplomatic relations deteriorated sharply.[8] After the Turkish invasion, Greece fortified some Aegean islands demilitarized under previous treaties. In response, Turkey accused Greece of violating international law and established its Aegean Army with amphibious capabilities in Izmir, further heightened Greek fears of Turkish intentions.[9][10] Greece refuted the accusations arguing that Samothrace and Lemnos were relieved of their demilirarized status through the Montreux Convention of 1936 and other islands were militarized after the formation of the Aegean Army.[11] This created a "chicken-and-egg" situation: Turkey justified its military presence by citing Greek fortifications, while Greece justified its fortifications by pointing to the Aegean Army.[9]

The sharp rise in oil prices during the 1973 oil crisis created acute supply pressures in Turkey and increased interest in exploring the Aegean for hydrocarbons. At the same time, exaggerated claims by Greece's military government in 1973 that significant oil reserves had been discovered near Thasos and Lemnos led Turkish policymakers to believe that Greece was attempting to monopolize Aegean oil resources.[12] Turkish explorations in the Aegean Sea found no oil reserves.[13] Soon after the fall of the Greek military government due to the invasion of Cyprus and the establishment of the Third Hellenic Republic in 1974, another crisis took place in the Aegean Sea. In August 1976, Turkey conducted seismic surveys, escorted by a Turkish warship, west of the Greek island Lesbos in the Aegean Sea, considered by Greece as part of the "Greek continental shelf."[14] Tensions escalated when Turkish representatives stated that the islands in the eastern Aegean Sea should have been Turkish, prompting Greek statements that a forceful response is forthcoming and the Greek army was on full alert, bringing the two countries to the brink of war.[14] Subsequently, Greece appealed to the UN Security Council (UNSC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ), giving sufficient time for the crisis to be defused through diplomatic efforts.[15] While the UNSC recommended restraint, the ICJ declared that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the Aegean continental shelf dispute. Later that year, the two sides signed the Bern Agreement, which aimed to freeze unilateral exploration activities. However, mutual suspicion persisted.[16][17][18]

Events

Pre-crisis

In 1981, Andreas Papandreou became Prime Minister of Greece and his government considered the November 1976 Bern Agreement's drilling ban east of Thasos void, since Aegean talks had stalled. However, his government was also entangled in legal disputes in an attempt to control oil firms that wanted to expand exploration beyond Greek waters.[19] The predominant Greek view at the time was that most of the Aegean continental shelf was Greek and so oil companies had to seek permission from the Greek state. Given these circumstances, exploration and extraction of oil beyond Greek waters was improbable.[20]

Miscommunication

Tensions started to rise on 19 February 1987, when Greece announced plans to purchase majority shares in foreign companies drilling near Thasos, citing the area's "strategic importance."[20][21] It was followed by an announcement by Denison Mines, a Canadian company, of plans to drill eight to ten miles east of Thasos, that was beyond Greece's territorial sea (six miles), but within its claimed space (twelve miles), angering the Greek government.[20][21] The Greek government faced a dilemma: allow exploration and risk a crisis with Turkey, or expropriate the company and take control itself. Although Greece believed it had a strong legal case, it feared a compromise ruling by the courts. Greek intelligence gathered in late 1986 also suggested that Turkey was planning to provoke a crisis to force Greece into bilateral negotiations. Papandreou decided to buy the shares of the company to control its activities.[21] However, Turkey viewed the company's public statement and Greek share purchase as confirmation of Greek intentions for oil exploration beyond its territorial waters, and amid its own bid for European Economic Community (EEC) membership, grew alarmed.[20]

Turkish ambassador Nazmi Akıman sought assurances from Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Yannis Kapsis that Greece had no intention of drilling beyond its territory. Kapsis, however, bluntly asserted Greece's sovereign right to drill anywhere on its continental shelf, even though it was not Greece's immediate plan.[20][21] Akıman interpreted this as an intent to drill beyond six miles, and Ankara warned that any activity in disputed areas would prompt a Turkish response. Greece refused to back down, announcing Aegean military exercises on 19 March.[20] On the same day, the Turkish survey vessel Piri Reis was sent to the area with an escort of two Turkish warships, and both nations put their military forces on high alert.[19][22]

Crisis peaked

Tensions peaked following strong statements from both prime ministers. Papandreou ordered the armed forces to sink any Turkish ship if it was found in Greek waters.[22] In a similar tone, Turkish prime minister Turgut Özal said that Turkey would respond if Greece interfered with its vessels, and cautioned to wait for any Greek initiative.[23] With Özal abroad for heart surgery and no direct communication channel in place, hard-liners in Ankara drove Turkey's overreaction, undermining Özal's efforts to ease the strained relations.[20] On 26 March, the Turkish Council of Ministers, while Özal was still in the United States, scheduled the survey vessel RV MTA Sismik 1,[b] to go to disputed waters around the Greek islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, and Lesbos, with the escort of another two[c] Turkish warships.[24] In the meantime, the Greek government ordered the mobilization of its naval vessels and personnel, and by March 27, a significant deployment of ships had been made in strategically important areas.[24] As the situation escalated, the US (particularly Robert V. Keeley, US ambassador in Athens) and Britain's Lord Carrington, the Secretary General of NATO, urged Greece and Turkey to avoid the use of force and offered to act as mediators.[25][26][23] Both of them met with Özal upon his return to Ankara via London.[25] On 27 March, Özal attempted to de-escalate the tension; he spoke to BBC radio, "There is no reason for tension. Turkey will not proceed to explore in the disputed areas, if Greece would not initiate exploration... The moment they go out we will also go out... The exploration vessel and our warships will remain within our territorial waters."[27]

Papandreou wanted to hold NATO, and especially the United States, responsible for Turkey's adventurism.[28] He ordered the suspension of the operation of the NATO communication base in Nea Makri (a town east of Athens), and he sent the Greek Foreign Minister, Karolos Papoulias, to Bulgaria, a Warsaw Pact member, for consultations with President Zhivkov.[28][29]

Diplomatic solution

In the meantime, Yiannis Boutos, a former minister and a friend of Papandreou, learned of the escalating situation during a meeting with Turkish ambassador Akıman.[30] Boutos rushed to Papandreou's home to brief Papandreou, who was unaware of the Kapsis–Akıman exchange. Acting on the prime minister's behalf, Boutos assured Akıman that Greece's share purchase aimed to stop, not extend, drilling east of Thasos.[30] Reassured, Akıman confirmed this with Kapsis and informed his government. The crisis ended on 28 March 1987, when Özal declared that Turkey would withdraw its vessels as long as Greece refrained from drilling beyond its territorial waters.[30][27]

Aftermath

Davos World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 1988 – Handshake between Prime Ministers Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal.

A day after the crisis ended, Papandreou communicated with Özal via their respective ambassadors over "secret talking points" diffusing the tense atmosphere.[30]

In January 1988, Papandreou and Özal met at the annual World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, to improve the relations between their two countries. Papandreou described the meeting as "a great event for the two nations," and Özal described it as "a breakthrough". Part of the meeting was a "no-war agreement", establishing a hotline between the two governments, and joint committees were established to work towards closer political and economic relations; the agreed framework of collaboration was named Davos process.[31] Papandreou sought this agreement to improve his image as a man of peace,[32] while Özal wanted to improve Turkey's image abroad as his country was under evaluation for full membership of the European Community.[33]

On 27 May 1988, the Political Committee met at the Athenian suburb of Vouliagmeni, where the Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias and his Turkish counterpart Mesut Yılmaz signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Confidence-Building Measures, aimed at reducing tensions and preventing future Greek-Turkish confrontations. Soon after, Özal, accompanied by Turkish entrepreneurs, visited Athens on 13–15 June 1988.[34] Despite the previous meetings, little progress was made until a subsequent meeting in Ankara on 6–9 September of the same year, where a document was signed establishing an understanding on preventing accidents in international waters.[34] Other meetings between the two sides focused on economic cooperation, in particular trade and tourism, and cultural exchanges.[35]

Internal pressure in both countries tarnished the Davos agreement. Özal faced resistance from the Turkish military-diplomatic establishment and from Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş.[36] Papandreou was criticized by the opposition for focusing on bilateral disputes and "shelving" the Cyprus dispute, forcing him later to denounce the Davos process and apologize from the podium of the Hellenic Parliament.[37] By the end of 1988, Greece reported 338 Turkish violations of the Greek airspace with 42 mock dogfights,[37] going against the "Davos spirit".[38] Moreover, on 20 December 1989, the European Commission rejected the Turkish application for a full membership in the EEC, which reduced the incentives for a diplomatic solution.[39] Eventually, tensions resurfaced over a series of incidents starting in 1994 and culminated in the Imia crisis in January 1996.[40] Nevertheless, the Davos process established after the 1987 crisis became a precedent for the Greek-Turkish dialogue.[41]

Notes

  1. ↑ In this article, "miles" refers to nautical miles.
  2. ↑ The appearance of Sismik 1 created a déjà vu impression to the Greek side since it also participated in the 1976 Aegean crisis.[19]
  3. ↑ Although the initial announcement said seven Turkish warships, two warships eventually escorted Sismik 1.[42]

References

  1. ↑ Tsakonas 2015, pp. 32–36.
  2. 1 2 Aydın 1997, pp. 116–117.
  3. ↑ Tsakonas 2015, p. 35.
  4. ↑ Ayman 2001, p. 59.
  5. ↑ Tsakonas 2015, p. 50.
  6. ↑ Heraclides 2010, pp. 71–72.
  7. ↑ Ayman 2001, p. 55.
  8. ↑ Heraclides 2010, pp. 86–88.
  9. 1 2 Aydın 2004, p. 30.
  10. ↑ CRS Report, p. 3.
  11. ↑ Veremis 1996, p. 23.
  12. ↑ Heraclides 2010, p. 78.
  13. ↑ Aydın 2004, p. 29.
  14. 1 2 Heraclides 2010, p. 88.
  15. ↑ Heraclides 2010, p. 89.
  16. ↑ Heraclides 2010, pp. 88–89.
  17. ↑ UPI Mar. 1987.
  18. ↑ Tsakonas 2015, pp. 32–34, 36–40.
  19. 1 2 Heraclides 2010, p. 120.
  20. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Heraclides 2010, p. 121.
  21. 1 2 3 4 Katsoulas 2021, p. 187.
  22. 1 2 Stergiou 2021, p. 146.
  23. 1 2 The New York Times Mar. (b) 1987.
  24. 1 2 Katsoulas 2021, p. 188.
  25. 1 2 Heraclides 2010, pp. 121–122.
  26. ↑ Katsoulas 2021, p. 190.
  27. 1 2 Katsoulas 2021, p. 191.
  28. 1 2 Tsakonas 2015, p. 46.
  29. ↑ The New York Times Mar. (a) 1987.
  30. 1 2 3 4 Heraclides 2010, p. 122.
  31. ↑ Clogg 2013, p. 189.
  32. ↑ Veremis 1993, p. 185.
  33. ↑ Katsoulas 2021, p. 194.
  34. 1 2 Heraclides 2010, p. 125.
  35. ↑ Heraclides 2010, p. 124.
  36. ↑ Heraclides 2010, p. 126.
  37. 1 2 Katsoulas 2021, p. 195.
  38. ↑ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2009, p. 168.
  39. ↑ Veremis 1996, p. 25.
  40. ↑ Veremis 1996, pp. 26–26.
  41. ↑ Kathimerini Feb. 2019.
  42. Katsoulas 2021, pp. 188, 191.

Sources

Books

  • Aydın, Mustafa; Ifantis, Kostas, eds. (2004). Turkish-Greek relations: the security dilemma in the Aegean. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-203-50191-8.
    • Aydın, Mustafa. "Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities". In Aydın & Ifantis (2004), pp. 21–51.
  • Clogg, Richard, ed. (1993). Greece, 1981–89: The Populist Decade. London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-349-23056-3.
    • Veremis, Thanos. "Defence and Security Policies under PASOK". In Clogg (1993), pp. 181–189.
  • —————— (2013). A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-65644-4.
  • Heraclides, Alexis (2010). The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-28339-8.
  • Katsoulas, Spyros (2021). The United States and Greek-Turkish Relations, The Guardian's Dilemma. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-000-51433-9.
  • Koliopoulos, John S.; Veremis, Thanos M. [in Greek] (2009). Modern Greece A History Since 1821. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-1-4443-1483-0.
  • Stergiou, Andreas (2021). Greece's Ostpolitik Dealing With the 'Devil'. Cham: Springer International Publishing. ISBN 978-3-030-61129-3.
  • Tsakonas, Panagiotes (2015). The incomplete breakthrough in Greek-Turkish relations: Grasping Greece's socialization strategy. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. ISBN 978-0-230-27807-3.

Journals and reports

Newspapers

Further reading

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