Kentucky v. Stincer
| Kentucky v. Stincer | |
|---|---|
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| Argued April 22, 1987 Decided June 19, 1987 | |
| Full case name | Kentucky v. Stincer |
| Citations | 482 U.S. 730 (more) |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Conviction reversed, 712 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1986), certiorari granted, 479 U.S. 1005 (1986) |
| Holding | |
| Respondent's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were not violated by his exclusion from the competency hearing. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Blackmun, joined by Rehnquist, White, Powell, O'Connor, Scalia |
| Dissent | Marshall, joined by Brennan, Stevens |
| Laws applied | |
| Confrontation Clause | |
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the respondent's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were not violated by his exclusion from the competency hearing.[1]
Significance
Although the respondent in this case lost, the case stands for the proposition that the criminal defendant's right to be present and participate in their trial is broader than the explicit protection of Confrontation. Under the Due Process Clause, the defendant has a right to be present at any critical stage of the trial where their appearance affects the fairness of the outcome.[1][2]
References
External links
- Text of Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) is available from: Cornell Findlaw Internet Archive (docket files) Justia
This article incorporates written opinion of a United States federal court. As a work of the U.S. federal government, the text is in the public domain.
