Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
| A joint Politics and Economics series |
| Social choice and electoral systems |
|---|
![]() |
|
|
| Part of a series on |
| Economics |
|---|
![]() |
|
|
In decision theory, the Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem proves mathematically that a rational social welfare function that satisfies the expected utility axioms and respects the Pareto indifference principle must be a weighted sum of individuals' utility functions.[1]
Theorem
Assumptions
- The society (or group) is rational and maximizes expected social welfare.
- Each individual in the group is rational and maximizes his individual's expected utility.
- If every individual in the group is indifferent between two probability distributions, then the group as a whole is indifferent as well.
Statement
John Harsanyi, through this theorem, proves that a social welfare function that satisfies these three assumptions, would be the weighted sum of expected individual utility functions.[2]
Mathematically, the social welfare function social welfare function can be represented as a linear combination of individual utilities:[3][4]
where:
- is the von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) utility function of individual .
- is the weight assigned to individual , reflecting the individual's contribution to social welfare.
- is a normalization constant, that does not affect the ordering of social preferences.
See also
References
- ↑ Risse, Mathias (2002). "Harsanyi's 'Utilitarian Theorem' and Utilitarianism". Noûs. 36 (4): 550–577. doi:10.1111/1468-0068.t01-1-00401. JSTOR 3506225.
- ↑ Ben_West🔸 (2020-02-20). "Harsanyi's simple "proof" of utilitarianism". Effective Altruism Forum. Retrieved 2026-07-17.
- ↑ Hammond, Peter J. (1992). "Harsanyi's Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical Connotations". In Selten, Reinhard (ed.). Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 305–319. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_17. hdl:1814/371. ISBN 978-3-662-09664-2.
- ↑ Mandler, Michael (July 2005). "Harsanyi's utilitarianism via linear programming". Economics Letters. 88 (1): 85–90. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.017.

