Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal Complex

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal Complex
Decided May 29, 1979
Full case nameGreenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal Complex
Citations442 U.S. 1 (more)
Holding
Parolees do not have a reasonable expectation of due process. Nothing in due process concepts requires a parole board to specify the particular "evidence" in the inmate's file or at his interview on which it rests its discretionary determination to deny release.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr. · Potter Stewart
Byron White · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun · Lewis F. Powell Jr.
William Rehnquist · John P. Stevens
Case opinions
MajorityBURGER, joined by STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST
Concur/dissentPOWELL
DissentMARSHALL (in part), joined by BRENNAN, STEVENS

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that parolees do not have a reasonable expectation of due process. Nothing in due process concepts requires a parole board to specify the particular "evidence" in the inmate's file or at his interview on which it rests its discretionary determination to deny release.[1][2] However, a statutory scheme can create a right to expect parole.[3][4]

Background

Under Nebraska statutes, a person incarcerated in prison became eligible for discretionary parole when their minimum term, less good-time credits, has been served. Hearings are conducted in two stages to determine whether to grant or deny parole: initial review hearings and final parole hearings. Initial review hearings must be held at least once a year for every inmate. At the first stage, the Board of Parole examined the inmate's pre-confinement and post-confinement record, and holds an informal hearing; the Board interviewed the person and considered any letters or statements presented in support of a claim for release. If the Board determined that the inmate was not yet a good risk for release, it denied parole, stating why release was deferred. If the Board determined that the person was a likely candidate for release, a final hearing was scheduled, at which the person could present evidence, call witnesses, and be represented by counsel. A written statement of the reasons was given if parole was denied. One section of the statutes (§ 83-1,114(1)) provided that the Board "shall" order an inmate's release unless it concluded that their release should be deferred for at least one of four specified reasons. Respondent inmates, who had been denied parole, brought a class action in federal District Court, which upheld their claim that the Board's procedures denied them procedural due process. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, agreeing, held that the inmates had the same kind of constitutionally protected "conditional liberty" interest as was recognized in Morrissey v. Brewer also found a statutorily defined, protectible interest in § 83-1, 114(1), and required, among other things, that a formal hearing be held for every inmate eligible for parole and that every adverse parole decision include a statement of the evidence relied upon by the Board.[1]

The Supreme Court granted certiorari.[1]

Opinion of the court

The Supreme Court issued an opinion on May 29, 1979.[1]

Later developments

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 Syllabus of Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Public Domain This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  2. ↑ Furbush, Michael (August 11, 2022). "Constitutional Law: Procedural Due Process and Civil Commitment". Florida Law Review. 45 (5): 921. ISSN 1045-4241.
  3. ↑ Trueb, Linda (July 1, 1987). "The Expectancy of Parole in Montana: A Right Entitled to Some Due Process". Montana Law Review. 48 (2). ISSN 0026-9972.
  4. ↑ Simon, Robyn. "Suspension of Inmate's Visiting Privileges Does Not Mandate Due Process Protection: Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904." Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law 38.1 (1990).