Cultural policy of China

Cultural policy in the People's Republic of China (PRC) since the beginning of Xi Jinping's administration in 2012 has largely continued the trend since reform and opening up that the state will "manage culture" but no longer "run culture". State bodies that set cultural policies or regulations include the Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party, the National Radio and Television Administration, among other bodies.

Cultural policy milestones during Xi's administration include the 2014 Beijing Forum on Literature and Art and the formulation of Xi Jinping Thought on Culture.

Background

As academic Richard Curt Kraus observes, "China's arts have long existed in greater intimacy with the state than is typical in the West. Imperial grandeur and Maoist revolution both presumed that art would serve the state".[1]: vii 

Mao Zedong era

At the Yan'an Forum in 1942, Mao Zedong described the ideological basis of the Communist Party's approach to the arts.[1]: 152  The core concept of the Yan'an Talks was that art should translate the ideas of the Chinese Communist Revolution for rural peasants.[2]: 159–160  This was an effort to reconfigure the social relationship in China between those who worked with their hands and those who wrote.[3]: 20  In this view, cultural workers and the masses would both serve as teacher and student for each other.[4]: 127  This revolutionary style of art would portray the lives of peasants and be directed towards them as an audience.[5] This approach rejected the idea of art for its own sake; rather, art should serve the needs of the masses.[1]: 152 

The revolution promoted amateur arts programs.[1]: 160  These expanded rapidly after the founding of the PRC.[1]: 160 

During the Mao era of the PRC, production of cultural work in China was state-funded.[6]: 66  Following the 1949 establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began re-organizing arts institutions through a series of partially coordinated economic and administrative policies.[1]: 37  These measures had the effect of (1) making the state the major patron of the arts in China, (2) developing cultural bureaucracies which sometimes competed for authority over arts policies, and (3) diminishing the commercialized pop culture of urban areas.[1]: 37 

In the early 1950s, the CCP prioritized controlling the relatively small cultural market, believing that commercialization of culture would lead to decadent values and weaken opposition to imperialism.[1]: 10  Nude works were discouraged, particularly as they offended peasants who had become represented in leadership after the revolution.[1]: 75 

In the early 1950s, cultural policy sought to revise the practices of Peking opera.[7]: 48–49  Mao Dun, the Minister of Culture, described the purpose of these policies as "to preserve and develop the positive traditions of old opera and eliminate the unreasonable and unrealistic aspects created by the prolonged effects of feudal society.[7]: 49 

During the third stage of agricultural collectivization, literary journals urged writers and artists to go into the countryside to see and report on the "high tide" of collectivization.[7]: 55 

The Hundred Flowers campaign was a period of relaxation in PRC ideological and cultural policy.[7]: 20 

The Great Leap Forward slogan of both red and expert was increasingly applied to the arts in the early 1960s.[1]: 160  In the cultural context, this slogan criticized the idea of "artistic genius" as a bourgeois trick to deny the artistic abilities of ordinary people.[1]: 160 

Mao died in September 1976. After the Smashing of the Gang of Four, Hua Guofeng and his allies were the short-term political victors.[1]: 15  In the cultural area, Hua's policy was largely centered on obtaining control of the mass media from his political opponents.[1]: 15 

After Reform and Opening Up

Deng Xiaoping restored cultural officials and arts establishments which had been disrupted by the Cultural Revolution.[1]: 15  This included an early wave of political rehabilitation of cultural figures and artworks that had been criticized during the Cultural Revolution.[1]: 55 

Through the political discourse of "socialist spiritual civilization", the Communist Party signaled to artists that cultural work can help restrain the negative social influences of markets.[1]: 22 

In the 1980s, changes to cultural policy included major themes like: (1) ending the iron rice bowl of permanent employment, (2) reforming the "big pot" of egalitarian pay, (3) professionalizing management, including through introducing a contract system for employment of performers, and (4) decreasing state subsidies, with making the arts economically self-sufficient as one of the expressed goals of cultural policy.[1]: 55–56 

In the 1990s, the state massively reduced its financial support for cultural production.[8]: 57  Deng's view was that state cultural organizations should have the goal of becoming self-financing.[1]: 17  Since the 1990s, cultural production in China is primarily market-driven,[6]: 67  particularly after Deng's 1992 southern tour.[9]: 225  The state's perspective since that period has been that it will no longer "run culture" but instead will "manage culture".[6]: 66  Particularly in the field of online cultural products, Chinese policymakers appreciate the economic benefits of cultural products and their significance as cultural exports while also being concerned that money-driven cultural production can lead to moral transgressions in the name of profit seeking.[6]: 70 

Deng receded from the Mao-era ideological tenet that class struggle remains in a socialist society.[1]: 17  In the area of cultural policy, this meant receding from the related idea that intellectual must struggle against their bourgeois educations.[1]: 17 

During Jiang Zemin's tenure, cultural policy was relatively unchanged.[1]: 22 

Since 2012

Xi has intensified efforts for a revival of traditional Chinese culture.[10] He has called traditional culture the "soul" of the nation and the "foundation" of the CCP's culture.[11] He has praised the "splendid Chinese civilization", calling the CCP's governance part of "the uninterrupted development of a civilization for several thousand years" which is "rarely seen among nations in the world".[12]

Academic Michel Hockx writes that "[m]ore than any of his post-Mao predecessors, Xi Jinping has tried to intervene in cultural policy and to set political and moral guidelines for literary production."[6]: 52  Xi's speeches to the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles have been more than twice as long as those of his predecessors.[6]: 52  Xi advocates for a conservative view of artistic works: they should adhere to traditional ideas of "truth, goodness, and beauty," avoiding provocation and artistic trends like modernism, post-modernism, and the avant-garde.[6]: 66–67 

During the 2014 antiprofanity campaign, online literature portals removed certain content deemed erotic, profane, and vulgar.[8]: 47 

In 2015, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT) issued its Guiding Opinions Concerning the Healthy Development of Online Literature. The Guiding Opinions stated that online literature portals should "enhance online literation editorial staff management mechanisms; implement appointment qualification systems; establish and improve systems such as the real-name registration of writers, the responsible editor system, the publishing unit undersigning system, etc."[8]: 48 

In 2017, SAPPRFT issued the Provisional Methods for Evaluating Social Benefits of Online Literature Publication Service Platforms, which proposed criteria to evaluate the social impact of literature portals in order to "improve the quality of published works, regulate the marker order, optimize the development environment, and guide internet literature publishers ... to constantly produce excellent works that organically integrate ideology, artistry, and readability, to better meet the people's spiritual and cultural needs."[8]: 48–49 

On 2 September 2021, the Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party announced that it would work on "comprehensive government" of the entertainment industry.[6]: 69  This was a response to excesses in the industry, including violations of law (such as tax evasion) and public scandals (as when a major online talent program had voting based on QR codes in milk caps, and some fans bought bottles solely for the QR codes and wasted the bottled milk).[6]: 69  The document stated that celebrity behavior that set a bad example for young people should be reined in, stating the need to curb "lawless and immoral entertainers" and "abnormal aesthetics."[6]: 69 

The same date, the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) issued a Notice stating that the entertainment industry's culture must be based on "loving the Party, loving the nation" and "upholding moral and artistic standards."[13]: 101  The Notice states that radio and television programs should uphold "cultural confidence" and "vigorously carry forward China's outstanding traditional culture, revolutionary culture, and advanced socialist culture."[13]: 101  The NRTA also included guidance to prevent fandom behaviors deemed unhealthy:[6]: 69 

Radio and television units and online audiovisual platforms must not broadcast talent cultivation programs. They must not broadcast variety shows or reality shows involving the children of celebrities. Voting shows must strictly control the voting set-up. There should be no segments or channels allowing for off-site voting, ranking, or supporting. Strictly forbid voting requiring covert expenses such as purchasing certain products or club memberships. Resist any and all unhealthy 'fandom' behavior.

The NRTA documented expressed the idea of "abnormal aesthetics" more concretely than the CCP Publicity Department did.[6]: 70  It stated that abnormal aesthetics included niangpao ("sissy pants", a derogatory term).[6]: 70  Cultural products deemed as having "abnormal aesthetics" have included danmei (Boys' Love) works.[6]: 70  As of 2026, the popularity of cultural products featuring non-heteronormative masculinities has not declined, although its connection with celebrity culture has decreased.[6]: 70 

The 2021 Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century addressed cultural matters.[6]: 71  It describes socialist culture and national solidarity having increased since Reform and Opening Up, but warns that "misguided ideas have often cropped up, such as money worship, hedonism, ultra-individualism, and historical nihilism".[6]: 71 

In June 2026, the NRTA implemented a campaign to against "harmful, lowbrow, and pirated" content in China's duanju (micro-drama) niche.[14] Among other areas, the campaign seeks to eliminate material deemed as harmful to children, wealth-flaunting, overly-sexualized, or which includes copyright infringing material.[14]

Beijing Forum on Literature and Art

This section is an excerpt from Beijing Forum on Literature and Art.[edit]

During the October 2014 Forum on the Work of Literature and the Arts in Beijing (wenyi gongzuo zuotanhui 文艺工作座谈会, or commonly, the Beijing Forum on Literature and Art), Xi Jinping delivered a speech on cultural policy and the role of literature and the arts in society. Xi emphasized that literary and artistic workers should create art that helps build moral qualities and socialist core values.

Xi Jinping Thought on Culture

This section is an excerpt from Xi Jinping Thought on Culture.[edit]

Xi Jinping Thought on Culture (Chinese: 习近平文化思想) is the current cultural, ideological, and propaganda doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a part of the larger Xi Jinping Thought, which is derived from the speeches of general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping. It was established during the National Conference on Publicity, Ideology and Cultural Work, held in October 2023.

See also

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Kraus, Richard Curt (2004). The Party and the Arty in China: The New Politics of Culture. State and Society in East Asia series. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ISBN 978-1-4175-0356-8.
  2. ↑ Minami, Kazushi (2024). People's Diplomacy: How Americans and Chinese Transformed US-China Relations during the Cold War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. doi:10.1515/9781501774164. ISBN 9781501774157.
  3. ↑ Kindler, Benjamin (2025). Writing to the Rhythm of Labor: Cultural Politics of the Chinese Revolution, 1942-1976. New York City, NY: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-21932-7.
  4. ↑ Qian, Ying (2024). Revolutionary Becomings: Documentary Media in Twentieth-Century China. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231204477. JSTOR 10.7312/qian20446.
  5. ↑ Liu, Kang (2000). "Popular Culture and the Culture of the Masses in Contemporary China". In Dirlik, Arif; Zhang, Xudong (eds.). Postmodernism and China. Duke University Press. pp. 111–112. ISBN 0-8223-8022-6.
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Hockx, Michel (2026). Literature and Censorship in Modern China. New York, NY: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781003483847. ISBN 9781032775838.
  7. 1 2 3 4 Lekner, Dayton (2025). A Hundred Flowers: How Literature Shaped Maoism. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781009600538.
  8. 1 2 3 4 Han, Rongbin (2026). Make China Great Again: Online Alt-History Fiction and Popular Authoritarianism. New York: Columbia University Press. doi:10.7312/han-22054. ISBN 978-0-231-22054-5. JSTOR 10.7312/han-22054.
  9. ↑ Tu, Hang (2025). Sentimental Republic: Chinese Intellectuals and the Maoist Past. Vol. 475. Harvard University Asia Center. doi:10.2307/jj.38479241. ISBN 9780674297579. JSTOR jj.38479241.
  10. ↑ "The Communist Party is redefining what it means to be Chinese". The Economist. 17 August 2017. Retrieved 23 January 2020.
  11. ↑ Zi, Yang (6 July 2016). "Xi Jinping and China's Traditionalist Restoration". The Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 23 January 2020.
  12. ↑ Tsang, Steve Yui-Sang; Cheung, Olivia, eds. (2024). The Political Thought of Xi Jinping. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 87. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197689363.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-768936-3.
  13. 1 2 Lin, Delia (2025). "Patriotic Nationalism as Commodity". In Hillman, Ben; Ji, Fengyuan (eds.). The Communist Party of China: Understanding the Durability of the World's Most Powerful Political Organization. New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009668385. ISBN 978-1-009-66843-9.
  14. 1 2 "'Distorted views': why China is clamping down on 'lowbrow' micro dramas". South China Morning Post. 2026-06-04. Retrieved 2026-06-05.
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